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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Market Reforms

in

Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union

After the hold of the communist ideology
large

had gradually weakened

to

among both

elites

and the population

at

an extent that the people of the former Eastern bloc

could finally remove the communist regimes from power, plans were
made to reorganize
the economies that had been nearly completely ruined by decades of
communist

man-

agement.

The Leninist economic framework was thoroughly

how

the transformation to a market

economy should be made. The

of how to accomplish such a transition and
that received the

become

most attention demanded

generally

article in

known

how to
radical

it

was not

clear

theoretical conception

revive the Eastern national economies

economic reforms.

as ‘shock therapy’ or ‘big bang’, and

The Economist by Jeffrey Sachs, professor

nomic adviser

discredited, but

at

It

has subsequently

was summarized

in a

1990

Harvard University and then eco1

to the

governments of Poland and Yugoslavia. He denounced any

“‘third

way’, such as a chimerical ‘market socialism’,” which several Eastern states had em-

barked on

at that

time only to see their economic instability increase, and he proposed

instead a four-part transformation program that he claimed

would

yield the greatest suc-

cess. First, establishment of real, market-clearing prices, second, liberalization of private

'

2

See Sachs (1990).
Ibid., p. 21.

economic

activity, third, privatization

market discipline, and
anced budget. With
ual change.

capitalist

fourth,

macroeconomic

this concept,

While both

parties

and democratic

of state enterprises, or
stability

at least their

subjection to

through low inflation and a bal-

he was arguing against the proponents of a more
grad-

have the same outcome

in

mind, that

institutions, the ‘gradualists’ prefer a

is

the creation of

slower pace of change and

reforms, on the ground that the transformation process in Eastern
Europe

is

unprece-

dented and without a sufficiently established conceptual framework. In their
eyes, rapid

change

will then lead only to the destruction of national economies,

system

is

because

quickly destroyed, efficient democratic structures will

this is a process

power of political

forces

which takes

time.

and while the old

fail to

emerge, simply

A likely consequence would be the coming to

which abandon reforms, and maybe even the commitment

to

democracy, endangering thereby the transformation process as a whole.

The shock therapy approach has profoundly influenced

Now,

Eastern European

states.

nomic, social and

political

formers have to deal with

after several years

the reform policy decisions of

of transition, the effects of the eco-

change can be observed. As a consequence, the radical

critics

who

claim that the

pressed in an unprecedented decline of the

GNP,

fall

re-

of the Eastern economies, ex-

has been higher than necessary, because

shock therapy demanded, for example, the breakup of the old Comecon markets, and

it

thus pitted one country against the other in a race for integration into the Western Euro-

pean markets. In the

critics’

view, declaring that radical reforms were the only

way

to

enter the world markets has allowed the governments to “legitimiz[e] privatization, un-

employment,

social differentiation

and the impoverishment of large sections of the

2

3

population ”. While progress,
data,

can be presented, the

at least in the

way

that is quantifiable in statistic

GDP growth is rather small,

economic

so that a return to the ‘pre-shock’

living standards appears to be unlikely within the
next decade. Moreover, increasing in-

come and wealth

human needs and

differentials threaten to destabilize the civil society.
Instead of

shifting the focus

of attention to the development of employment and

social welfare policies, the countries’

pared to

come up

to

economic and

Western requirements

tion of the neoclassical paradigm

is

is

social structures are resolutely pre-

in order to attract investments

pervasive ”.

-

“the inculca-

4

The advocates of rapid reforms never denied
formation

meeting

the fact that the process of rapid trans-

a painful one, but they discounted these costs in favor of the benefits of the

quick and successful recovery that these countries would undergo in the following.

Moreover, they do not claim
forever.

At a

certain

that

moment

shock therapy

is

supposed

to

during the transition process, a

ever, not exactly determined by the theorists, market

shape domestic policies

moment which

economy

was, how-

will be established,

the country will be able to adjust the socio-political framework according to

its

and

wishes

and needs.

A Test Case

The

for

Shock Therapy: The ‘Estonian Way’

Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, were three of the republics that

emerged as independent nations

3
4

Gowan

(1996),

as the Soviet

p. 53.

Reardon (1996),

p.

636.

3

Union

collapsed. Like

all

former states

with a centrally planned economy, they were willing
to

an economy determined by market

to face the hardship

forces. Unlike the Eastern

of the transition

European countries, they

were also faced with the additional challenge of re-establishing
a separate economy
almost

after

years of complete integration into the economic system
of the Soviet Union.

fifty

This meant a reorientation of trade,

at least partially,

from the former Soviet republics

towards the West. The main feature of this second challenge, however,
was the introduction of a national currency, a milestone both economically as a
step to de-link from the

Russian ruble-zone and psychologically as a significant symbol of national
sovereignty

and independence. However, a new currency

is

generally prone to instability, due to

lack of reputation in the financial markets, which

new government’s

ability to successfully

is

manage

its

largely due to uncertainty about the

the exchange rate in an environment of

rapid and erratic political and economical change.

Estonia serves as a prominent example of a country in which the shock therapy para-

digm

for the formulation

of economic policies for transition countries profoundly

enced the way reforms were approached. The country implemented
tization

them
rency

and

stabilization

rather quickly.

stability,

through

its

measures

Most of all,

it

in all fields

‘Estonian Way’, as

I

little

impact on almost

room

all fields

will call the country’s

activity,

for deviations

and

it

implemented

result has

from the radical path

of economic decision making. The

approach to reforms, therefore includes not

only the radicality and speed of shock therapy, but also

form of a currency board. The

liberalization, priva-

established a currency board as a device to ensure cur-

a policy which leaves

restrictive

of economic

influ-

its

‘institutionalization’ in the

been a largely painful process of adjustment

4

to

the

new economic

therapy approach.

reality.

As

I

The country can

show

will

headed by the currency board, are

come

to a point

therefore serve as a ‘test case’ for the
shock

in this paper, the Estonian

likely to

remain

reform measures, spear-

in place until the transition process has

where shock therapy can be replaced by

‘fine tuning’,

because shock

therapy has succeeded well enough to prevent the formation
of a strong coalition of opponents.

The Currency Board

as the

Epitome of the ‘Estonian Way’

The government of Estonia decided
the

German deutschmark. To

detrimental effects that a

open economy linked
through the

restrictive

shield

it

to

peg

from

its

national currency, the kroon (crown), to

inflation

and devaluation, and

weak currency would have on

to the

world markets, the

to avoid the

Estonia’s plans to develop into an

viability

of this peg was reinforced

mechanism of a currency board. This

change-rate management, which has mainly been used by

rather unusual

Hong Kong and

method of exa

number of

other British colonies, epitomizes the very firm approach to reform which Estonia had

chosen, along the lines of the shock therapy theory.

other states, including

pegged

its

Baltic neighbors.

their currencies to the

US

dollar

Its rigidity sets

Estonia apart from

While Lithuania and Latvia have recently

and the

SDR of the International Monetary Fund,

respectively, neither the process of currency reform itself nor the political approach to

market reforms were as radical and

drastic as in Estonia, nor

have the other former Soviet

republics adopted such a radical approach. Thus, the ‘Estonian

5

Way’ provides

a particu-

larly clear case, permitting for

proach, the shock therapy,

The major

an assessment of how successful the radical
reforms ap-

is.

political goal for Estonia is integration into
the

‘Return to Europe’

is vital to this

country in light of statements about the reconstruction

of the old Russian empire issued by certain
Russian troops continued
nally

to

withdrawn on August

political factions in

be stationed on Estonian territory
31st, 1994, did not help to put the

ease. Integration, however, requires the adoption of the rules

tional trade

impose

Moscow. The

The decision

to

on

fact that

until the last units

were

minds of the Estonians

it

trade and capital flows to create exchange rate stability.

adopt a fixed exchange rate and the currency board demonstrates that

the academic term for an approach to exchange rate policy in

likely

tie

domestic inflation to the inflation

rate

which the exchange

is

rate is

of another country, most

5

an important trading partner. This means that the Estonian government regards

exchange

rate policy as

broke loose

in

zation effect,

many of the

it

is

this

5

other former Soviet republics after 1991. Next to this stabili-

also supporting liberalization by importing the world market prices as

In the case

regime exogeneously given,

of Estonia, the choice

many, the high

volatility

basket, such as the

its

an instrument for avoiding the hyper-inflationary tendencies that

the basis of calculation for the domestic production.

under

at

impossible to

the Estonian government chose to use the exchange rate as a ‘nominal anchor’. This

primarily used to

fi-

and norms of the interna-

regime and thus a degree of economic openness that makes

tight restrictions

A

Western European world.

of the

fell

dollar,

ECU. See Rudnick

it

As

the domestic monetary policy

is

serves as a credible signal for domestic price

on the deutschmark because of its
and because

it

was

(1993), p. 1 60.

6

stability, the trade links to

Ger-

better to understand for the population than a

and wage

setting

6
.

The nominal anchor approach

also a deliberate constraint of the

is

domestic policy choices. The scope of monetary and
deficit

spending

is

not possible

rency board to balance

two ways.

It

patible with

7
.

As

peg be maintained. Unable

its

goal to establish an open economy, or

it

could borrow money, which

private borrowing and therefore seriously

especially since

governmental

stability policies,

wage

which

settings,

program. Credibility

it is

strongly backed by the currency

is in

is

sector. It lends credibility to

which induces private agents

to adjust their price

achieved by the fact that a currency board

of inflation and currency

and

turn an important prerequisite for every successful stabilization

budget deficits of the government, a procedure that
instability.

is

is

not able to finance

widely regarded as the main cause

The currency board of Estonia provides

with a kroon as stable and reliable as the currency

it

is

pegged

to, the

the country

deutschmark. The

of the kroon has proven to be a major asset for the economic transformation of

the former Soviet republic, as well as for

6

hamper economic develop-

a consequence, the government has to remain committed to a balanced budget.

board mechanism, also influences the actions of the private

new

borrow from the cur-

budget, the Estonian government could pursue fiscal
policies in

its

The nominal anchor approach,

stability

to

because

could either impose tight restraints on imports, which would
not be com-

would crowd out
ment

if the

fiscal policies is limited,

links

its

ability to attract

investment and to establish

and patterns of production and trade with the world.

As opposed

to the ‘real targets’ approach, in

which the nominal exchange

rate,

along with other policy

instruments, serves as a tool for the government to actively pursue internal and external equilibria.
7
Especially since access to capital is very limited in an underdeveloped domestic capital market such as
Estonia’s.

7

Yet, the price of this success

ernment with very few and

is

high. Since having a currency board
leaves the gov-

restricted policy instruments for steering
the

economy,

adopting this approach basically means giving up one
of the central features of national
sovereignty.

last thirty

the

economic history of a vast number of newly emerged

states

of the

years shows, governments have generally been very
unwilling to relinquish this

power. As a

nance the

As

result,

deficit,

they sooner or later used the central bank to ‘run the press’
and

which caused

inflation, loss

of credibility, and with

it

fi-

the loss of low-

cost access to international financial markets.

Viability of the Estonian

Way

Since the currency board

is

is

one expression of the Estonian shock therapy approach,

not meant to be in place for eternity. This was indeed stated

by the economists who proposed

8
it

and by the Estonian government

The success of the currency board, and with

it

ent scenarios are imaginable. First, the currency board

who have

it

is

will be

it

not a radical change, but rather

8

implemented

it.

Way, can

abandoned.

Two

differ-

suffered from the transition process, and the resulting policy changes are

government no longer regards

first

that

dropped under the pressure of

a backlash against shock therapy. Second, the currency board

The

occasions both

the success of the Estonian

therefore be assessed by the circumstances under which

those

at several

it

is

dropped because the

as necessary for the transition, and the resulting policy

still

a

commitment

to the principles

is

of a market economy.

case might be accompanied by the rise of a large oppositional movement, which

See, for example, Hanke, Jonung and Schuler (1992).

8

is

maybe even

directed against the democratic principles,

and the demise of the governing party or
failed to bring the

ries,

and

it

economic

would have

political stability, as

second case,

it

it

coalition.

stability predicted

failed to support the

was expected

would be a

to

The Estonian

unrest,

Way would then have

by the underlying macroeconomic theo-

development of democratic structures the

come with

success, because

some degree of public

it

positive

economic development. In the

actually did support the creation of a

democratic framework within which the market economy can be formed
according
political will

and have

to

of the Estonian people. The governing party or coalition may lose

go

into opposition, but

An assessment of the

viability

it

its

to the

power

will not be profoundly discredited.

of the Estonian

Way must therefore

clude the political repercussions of the economic development of the

be extended to

last

in-

years in transi-

tion.

According
institutions,

Estonian

ing,

to the statistics published

and according

Way

seems

to

to the laudeats issued

be working out so

and the currency remains

ity is

ready

working the way

come

by Estonian authorities as well as international

it

stable.

far.

by the international economic

Economic development

The currency board

is

press, the

indeed astonish-

as a device for monetary stabil-

was conceptualized. However, even though reforms have

a long way, the country

is still

al-

not at a point where the transition period can

be considered complete.

The introduction of a currency board

in

1992 met

little

opposition, apparently because

of a general consensus brought about by both the fear of a devastating hyper-inflation and
the desire to get rid of the ‘occupation currency’, the Russian ruble. Estonian economic

9

planners were expecting that the maintenance
of a stable and reliable currency would be
well worth the sacrifices, since
deliver

which

economic benefits

it

will foster

to the majority

economic development, and

of Estonians. However, an economic policy

stresses efficiency nevertheless has distributional
effects,

tainly leave particular social groups dissatisfied, to
say the least.
transition

this will in turn

have definitely yielded different gains

Gains of wealth are recently indicated by the

-

or losses

statistics,

-

which

will almost cer-

Four years of economic

for different social groups.

but they have surely not been

evenly distributed. The strong commitment to a balanced budget leaves

little

room

for

appropriate social security and welfare institutions.

So

far,

the widespread consent in the Estonian society that economic hardship has to

be endured to keep the currency stable and the economy recovering, has survived even
the dramatic decrease of the

economy

that followed

immediately after the currency

re-

form. However, different gains and losses can be reasonably expected, and thus the eco-

nomic conditions of different

social groups

have

to

be taken into consideration. Political

tensions are most likely to arise out of the situation of people

down
fits,

the social ladder or see no chance to climb up. People

such as the unemployed, or whose only income

is

who

either fear to slide

who depend on

social bene-

a pension, such as the elderly, are

money

suffering from an insufficient social security net, which can only pay

little

government

expenditures. In the

is

forced to balance the budget and to closely monitor

its

if the

case of Estonia, a ‘derelict’ of the Soviet era, a large group of ethnic Russians which

generally highly skilled

attention, because

work

is

a

force but yet without Estonian passports, deserves special

economic aspects become mixed with

10

nationalistic ones in this con-

text. If the

demand

losers’

of the reforms seek to improve

that the existing policy be

their condition, they

abandoned as a whole,

if

might eventually

government measures

to

ameliorate their situation that are compatible with the
economic reforms prove to be ineffective or insufficient.

The broad

coalition of consensus that supported the
establishment

of the currency board would then break
strict policies

in turn

apart.

This might in turn lead to a break with the

of the currency board approach and the path of monetary

might endanger the reform process

austerity,

which

in general.

Scope of This Study

In the following chapters,

fects

have not given

I

will

show

rise to a coalition

that the Estonian

is

means

that the

limiting

and with

its

it

government

all

positive

success, and with

it

likely to continue with its present policies. This

will be able to reap the

economic development, which

all

The Estonian

the

proach will have reason

distributive ef-

economic calculations and

outcome

it

expected from voluntarily

policy choices through the adaptation of a currency board

politically stable society.

As

its

perfect and before Estonia could drop the

currency board. If no unexpected external shocks make

is

and

of economically disadvantaged groups that might

topple the arrangement before the transition

predictions obsolete, the country

Way

economic

Way will

is

find

theorists that

-

a stable currency

undoubtedly one of the

its

way

into the history

pillars

of a

books as a

have advised the currency board ap-

to rejoice.

this thesis discusses the implications

the case of one small country,

it

is

as

much

and

results

of the shock therapy approach

a case study as

it

deals with a general

in

model

of economic theory. The mechanisms
specified
icy formulation derived from

it,

may

apply to

in a

all

model, and the propositions for pol-

Eastern economies, the results, on the

other hand, depend on the special circumstances
under which each country finds

Chapter

will introduce the reader to Estonia,

II

conditions under which

it

had

to operate after

its

it

history,

itself.

and the economic and social

regained independence in 1991 Chapter
.

III

begins with a description of the main reform measures that
are part of the Estonian

Way, and

it

will discuss the

economic and security considerations

tonia’s decision to turn to the

gime. This

is

West and

the

open

liberal

that stand

behind Es-

markets of the world trade

re-

followed by an introduction to the economic theory behind the central fea-

ture of the Estonian

Way, currency

stability.

A discussion of the importance of a stable

currency and the role of the exchange rate regime as an instrument in the battle against
inflation

is

followed by a comparison of the general features of a central bank and a cur-

rency board as two institutions that can back an exchange rate regime. Chapter IV will
then introduce the Estonian currency board, beginning with the events that led to the cur-

rency reform in 1992. The institutional set-up of the board will be explained,

where the Estonian board corresponds or deviates from
followed by a short report on

how the new

I

will

the theoretical model. This

indicators: the

situation, the

1

992

V, the results of the reform measures will be presented through a

review of the overall economic performance of the Estonian economy.

economic

is

currency was introduced. The chapter con-

cludes with a discussion of the performance of the Estonian currency board from

until today. In chapter

show

development of the GNP, the

development of international

trade,

12

I

inflation rate, the

use selected

employment

and the development of foreign direct

investment. In chapter VI
ability

level

I

will discuss the

shadow economy and

of the figures presented in the chapter before, and
with

of dissatisfaction within the Estonian society. This

is

its

it its

effects

s

largest foreign ethnic group, the Russians,

is

presented.

faction in Estonia has transferred into political pressure

the development of the political landscape

is

is

on the

on the possible

shown

Then

the situation of

How little the dissatisin section VI. D.

cautious.

tion.

Even

on banking reform. The paper

if the

Estonian

Shock therapy promises

orous as

is still

it

Way

is

turns out to be a success,

if

one considers

not paradise.

13

is

shown

in

concluded with an argument to be

to lead a country to the

might appear, and even

when

reviewed. That quick and radical reforms

can also be well conceptualized, which can only bolster the support for them,
the last paragraph

reli-

followed by a presentation of

the various groups that have been hit the hardest
by unemployment.

Estonia

effects

it

it

does not yield satisfac-

Western economic world. As glamto

be better than the alternatives,

it

CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

A

A.

Brie f History of Estonia

Estonia, the northernmost of the three Baltic states, has
not always been as

from the European stage as

When the

it

was during

its

decades as a republic of the Soviet Union.

country was annexed by Joseph Stalin in 1940,

napped from the European family” 9 of which
independence

The

after

World War

removed

it

it

was

in fact “stolen or kid-

had been a sovereign member since

its

I.

native tribes of the Baltic region were invaded and colonized by

German and

Scandinavian crusaders in the 12th and 13th century, and the region was then subject

wide variety of rulers. The Danes, the Teutonic Order and
followed by the Russians under

1

tsar Peter

I

the

the

awakening of a

mainly the urban

Swedes were ultimately

(the Great) in the 17th century. In the late

8th century, Russification policies employed by the rulers in

social structure of the

German-speaking landowner

Moscow turned

against the

class and, less successfully, against

cultural national identity of the Estonians. In the beginning,

intellectuals

who showed

to a

it

was

increasing interest in the special features of

Estonian culture, such as the language, folk songs and costumes, but towards the end of
the century, these activities found their expression

and popular

agitation. This gradual

4

British foreign secretary

more and more

in political

development of a national consciousness

Douglas Hird, as quoted

in

Iwaskiw (1996),

14

p. xix.

demands
finally re-

suited in a strong

movement

revolution of 1905.

It

was

for independence that stepped forth
during the Russian

violently repressed

by the

tsarist forces,

however, and

it

was

not until the Wilsonian ideal of the right of
self-determination of the people became an
international norm, and both the

sufficiently

weakened

after

World War

hood, along with the other Baltic

Due

German and

states,

I,

Soviet Russian occupation forces were

that Estonia reached sovereignty

and

state-

Latvia and Lithuania.

to its geographical location, the region

had served as a trading post

for the east-

west routes as well as for the north-south trade as early as the 13th and
14th century. The

Order of the Teutonic Knights was a member of the Hanseatic League,
the merchants of the

main Estonian

seaports.

to the profit

of

At the same time, however, the German

knights established serfdom and maintained a feudal system in the rural parts, which ex-

cluded large parts of the native population from the beneficial trade of the urban areas.

The Russians kept
landed

German

this

system under

their rule,

which ensured them the loyalty of the

gentry of the region. After the peasantry received personal emancipation

between 1816 and 1819, the way was open

for industrial capitalism to develop.

By

the

end of the 19th century, Estonia had become most heavily industrialized province of the
Russian empire.
In the years following

and was admitted

its

into the

tional currency, the kroon,

history of Estonia

became

independence, Estonia introduced a democratic constitution

League of Nations together with

was introduced
tainted after

its

for the first time.

growing

Baltic neighbors.

Even though

political instability in the

The na-

the democratic

1930s led

the suspension of the parliament and the introduction of an authoritarian regime that

15

to

ruled by decree until 1940,

it

was

this period

political self-determination in the history

late

1980s would refer to in

In 1939, Nazi

its

of the

‘First Republic’, the

only period of

of Estonia, that the separation movement
of the

quest for the restoration of independence.

Germany and Russia signed

the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact,

which

as-

signed Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to the Soviet sphere
of influence. In 1940, the Red

Army

entered the Baltic territories, dissolved the governments,
secretly deported or

killed their leaders,

the Estonian

and created a pro-Soviet government

Communist

Party

was allowed

to run.

after

an election

in

which only

Following a formal request of this

puppet regime, Estonia was admitted as a republic into the Soviet Union on August
10

1940.

Army

While the country came under German Nazi

regained possession of the country

at the

rule

from 1941

end of World

War

II,

to 1944, the

6,

Red

and the Soviet era

continued.

Economically, the era of independence brought a quick recovery from the devastation

of World
Baltic

As

War I. A

German

land reform

was

carried out

nobility and increased the

industrial sector

the late 1930s.

showed

was employed

significant progress as well,

Both Estonia’s economic development and

Scandinavian neighbors

large estates of the

number of small farms by about 100

a result, almost one half of the population

The

which broke up the

percent.

in the agricultural sector.

and doubled

its

its

production in

situation equaled that of

its

at that time.

Soviet rule drastically changed the economic structure of Estonia. Not only were the

Bolsheviks quick to nationalize the Estonian economy

10

See

Pettai (1996), p.

1

8.

16

after their takeover in 1940, they

also tore

them
its

down

large parts of the already war-ravaged
industrial facilities to reconstruct

in Russia.

The country

also suffered significant losses of
population, especially of

educated upper classes, which emigrated in large
numbers. 10,000 Estonians were de-

ported by the Russians in 1941. Between 1941 and
1944, the Nazis persecuted
nists

and the Jewish population.

When the

Commu-

Russians returned in 1944, about 70,000 Es-

tonians fled into exile to Sweden, Great Britain, the
United States and Australia, setting

up communities
11

ades.

that lobbied

on behalf of their mother country

Another 25,000 people were deported

in the

in the following dec-

wake of the

agricultural collectivi-

zation of the late 1940s. Between 1940 and 1950, a total of over than
200,000 people

were

killed, deported, forcefully conscripted into the

Russian army, or went into

out of a population of slightly more than one million. 12

exile,

A shortage of labor force was the

consequence, especially since the Soviet Union pushed the development of industrial
production

facilities.

In the following decades,

mainly from Russia, would be

many people from

settled in Estonia, a policy that

other Soviet republics,

profoundly altered the

ethnic composition of the country.

With the ultimate decay of the Soviet Union,

the forces of independence

again. Estonia’s statehood had remained being recognized

momentum when the

ment a legitimacy

11

12

See

that

rallies for

independence

went beyond secessionism

Pettai (1996), p. 19.

Van Arkadie and Karlsson

(1992),

p.

91.

17

forth

by the Western world. What

appeared as an insignificant act of formality in the face of the
nance, gained

came

reality

started.

to the restitution

of Russian domi-

It

gave the move-

of an independent

statehood which had never ceased to exist
not only in the minds of the Estonian
people,
but also in the eyes of major foreign powers.

The drive

for

independence developed out of ecological protest
movements which

were made possible by the era of liberalization

that

had arrived through the introduction

of Michail Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost n and perestroika 14

in the

second half of the

1980s. Further autonomous political actions followed. Estonian
liberal economists published a plan for

economic autonomy. Peaceful demonstrations, accompanied by the

singing of traditional Estonian folk songs, took place in the

streets.

The publication of

the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in 1989 revealed
the illegitimacy of

Soviet rule over Estonia and fueled further protests. In 1990, radical groups started
to
register citizens of the pre-war republic

and

their descendants, declaring that this

was

the

only electorate that could legitimately decide about Estonia’s future. In February 1990,
the ’Congress of Estonia’

for independence.

one month
cisive

was

elected as a counter-parliament to spearhead the struggle

The importance of the Congress, however, was

later elections for the ‘official’ parliament, the

70 percent majority

to pro-independence forces,

limited by the fact that

Supreme

15

Soviet,

gave a de-

even though the electorate

in-

cluded also residents that were not ethnic Estonians.

Although there were no events

in Estonia similar to the

crackdown on

civilians

by

Soviet Union military forces in Vilnius and Riga in January 1991, the acceptance of

Russian rule and the Soviet regime further deteriorated. The culmination point came with

13

14

“Russian term for public discussion of
“Literally, restructuring. [The]

economy, communist

party,

issues; accession

campaign

in the

of information...” Glossary (1996),

and society by adjusting

political, social,

sary (1996), p. 284.
15

The Supreme Soviet was

later

p.

283.

Soviet Union in the middle to late 1980s to revitalize the

renamed the Supreme Council.

18

and economic mechanisms” Glos-

the

coup

in

Moscow on August

Baltic Soviet military

linn, the

19, 1991,

command. While Soviet

Supreme Council declared

national recognition.

full

December

B.

1.

The

6.

Shortly thereafter,

it

it

by the

troops were on the march towards Tal-

independence on August 20 and asked for

The coup collapsed within a few

internationally in the following weeks.

on September

and the declaration of support for

The

days, and Estonia

was recognized

USSR itself accepted Estonian

declared

its

own

inter-

independence

dissolution and ceased to exist on

31, 1991.

The Social and Economic

St ructure of Estonia at the Outset of Independence

New Country

Estonia has a land area of about 43,200 square kilometers, which includes 1,520
lands in the Baltic sea.

gions possess

16

While the lower parts of the country are marshy, the upper

fertile soils.

The highest elevation

is 3

1

8 meters

above sea

percent of the country consists of forests, twenty percent of the area

marshlands. In the northern parts, eastward of Tallinn,

ever,

of rather low

quality.

oil shale is

is

level.

is-

re-

About 40

covered by

mined, which

is,

how-

Other significant natural reserves are phosphorites, limestone

and dolomites.

The population

in

1989 was 1.565 million. The extreme change of the ethnic com-

position of the country

16

is illustrated

by the following

17

figures.

Total size 45,226 square kilometers, “slightly larger than Vermont and

In 1939, 88.2 per cent of

New

Hampshire combined”.

Pettai (1996), p. 3.
17

For the figures on the ethnic composition of Estonia, see Brawer (1994),

19

p.

63.

the population, about 1,000,000 people,
were Estonian.

on people from other

parts of the Soviet

Union were

As mentioned

sent to Estonia to

above, from 1945

work

mining and the developing heavy industry. The census of
1989 showed
per cent of the citizens of the

ESSR

tants

By

1994, these relations had not signifi-

About 70 percent of the population

cities are the capital, Tallinn,

and a university

that

lives in

is

was founded

in

1632 by the Swedish

very unequally distributed over the country.

dominantly employed

in the

urban areas. The major

with 500,000 inhabitants, and Tartu, with

towns are Narva, with 82,000 and Kohtla-Jarve with 77,000
population

that only 61 .5

were ethnic Estonians, while ethnic Russians, Belo-

russians and Ukrainians constituted 36 percent.
cantly changed.

in oil-shale

heavy industry, they were

rulers.

residents.

As

1

10,000 inhabi-

Other major

The non-Estonian

the immigrants were pre-

settled in the highly industrialized

region in the north-east, where Estonians became the minority. Only 47 percent of the
inhabitants of Tallinn, for example, are Estonians, and so are only a minority of 4 per

cent of the residents of Narva.

The

rural parts,

on the other hand, remained

rather

homo-

geneously Estonian.

2.

Estonia’s

Economy

at

Independence

At the outset of independence

in 1991, the

new

Estonian state had to deal with the

legacy of fifty years of Soviet Russian annexation, a period in which not only the ethnic

composition of the population was altered immensely. Soviet rule also affected the

18

See the 1994 estimates

in Pettai

(1996),

p. 4.

20

structure of the Estonian

economy and

the

minds of the

individuals. Since Estonia

already been one of the more industrialized
regions of the

turned the region into a ‘production
factured

all

facility’

USSR,

of the Union. Large

had

the central planners

state enterprises

manu-

kinds of goods, while they procured the raw
materials from other parts of the

Union. Facilities for military production and the exploitation
of the natural resources of
the oil shale region were also set up.

The small farms were

bined to gigantic agricultural production

formed the
industrial

rural regions.

and

As

facilities,

collectivized, that

is,

com-

a policy which profoundly trans-

a result, entrepreneurship largely disappeared both in the

in the agricultural sector. Individual

economic

activity

was replaced by

the

collective goal of plan fulfillment.

When

Estonia was incorporated into the system of centralized planning of the

the old pre-war trade patterns were disrupted, and the country

demand and supply markets of the

economic basis of the

its

to

nationalization of enterprises destroyed the

and the middle

class.

Expansion under the Soviet

account for 50 percent of the net material production

by the end of the 1980s. 33 percent of the workforce was employed
average number of employees per enterprise of 792.

19

19

new

and a clear distinction from the agrarian south. Though

As a comparison,
Bank (1993), p. 86.

the average for the European

Community

21

is

in industry,

with an

The concentration of industrial

production in the oil-shale region in the North-East led to

tion

the

predominantly agrarian structure to one of the

USSR. The

local capitalist

regime led the industrial sector

became dependent on

other Soviet republics, most prominently those of

Soviet Russia. Estonia changed from

leading industrial regions of the

USSR,

centers of industrializa-

oil-shale as a source of en-

160 employees per enterprise. See World

ergy

tutes

is

not an economical input factor at world
prices because of its costliness,

one of the few energy sources of the region. 20 The

strong in the pre-war republic,

was

such as cotton, from Russia, and

also heavily dependent

its

the break with the Soviet Union."

textile

it

consti-

production sector, already

on imports of raw materials,

future comparative advantage

was questionable

after

1

Estonia’s industrial strongholds were a relatively di-

versified sector of machine-building and metallurgy and the
food products industry,

which employed about

With

thirteen per cent

of the industrial labor

force, as table

1

shows.

the shortages of raw material from Russia, the sector had already
suffered a severe

decline of production during the final days of the Soviet era, a situation
which would

continue after economic independence was established and makes short-term adjustment
problematic.

22

The many small farmers had

to give

collectivized in

huge

were employed

in the agrarian sector,

up

their piece

agricultural enterprises.

of land, people and property were

By 1990

only 12 per cent of the labor force

which accounted

for about

22 per cent of national

production, the most important products being meat and dairy products. The agricultural
sector also provided the major share of the input of the food industry, which accounted

for another

24 percent of the

total net material production.

Yet, Estonian agriculture

depended heavily on input imports from other Soviet

republics, especially fertilizer

feed grains for the large collective farms. Along with

all

fuel shortages caused significant

20

See van Arkadie and Karlsson (1992),

p. 100.

Ibid., p. 100.

23

See World Bank (1993),

p. 88.

See World Bank (1993),

p. 97.

other sectors of the industry,

problems for agriculture. The multi-faceted task the

21

22

and

22

agrarian sector faced at the outset of
independence
that date

back

to the

was

the restitution of property rights

pre-war republic, the introduction of a pricing
system for input and

output, and the establishment of a support system
that

would be able

to provide the tech-

nological assistance and information processing
necessary for a market-oriented agricultural production.

Table

1:

Industrial Structure of Estonia in 1989

Share of Industrial
Production (in

Electrical

Energy

Employees

(in

7.2

Fuel Industry

2.6

11.3

Chemicals

9.2

16.2

14.4

58.2

Timber, Pulp, Paper

9.1

28.0

Building Materials

3.6

14.3

Light Industry

26.4

43.3

Food Industry

23.9

28.2

Others

4.8

14.6

All Enterprises

100

221.3

/

Metalwork

Source: Estonian

Statistical

Yearbook 1990; van Arkadie and Karlsson (1992),

23

,000)

%)

6.0

Machinery

1

p.

101.

It

was obvious

that the Soviet policy

of establishing gigantic industrial and
agronomic

enterprises had to be radically reversed, because
with independence, the input supply

channels were

be priced

now transnational,

at real

market

levels.

the Eastern markets were lost, and the
products had to

However, even though the

industrial structure

was so

completely out of line with the demands of the international
markets, the chances for
small Estonia to successfully adjust to open market conditions
were
better than those of

most other

republics.

still

The import and export share of the

duction of Estonia was notably higher than the average Soviet Union

ESSR exported about 42

conceived to be

rate.

total pro-

In 1990, the

percent of its output. However, about 90 to 95 per cent of these

exports went to other Soviet republics, and about one half of the remainder to other Socialist states.

New markets and trade connections had to be established.

Gorbachev reforms,

the

to negotiate trade

all

Soviet republics and state enterprises were granted the right

agreements directly in 1989. As a consequence, the number of Esto-

nian economic institutions with direct foreign-trading rights
to 3, 200

by 1991.

One of the

In the course of

-

and connections

-

had risen

24

sectors that has been attributed the best chances for future development

the services sector, mainly the tourism industry.

The old towns,

numerous inland lakes of Estonia had already been

is

the shores, islands and

the source of streams of tourists,

mostly from the Eastern world. With the end of this low value mass tourism, the country
has

now the

this

promises more economic benefits,

24

unique chance to upgrade

See van Arkadie and Karlsson (1992),

this sector

it

will,

p. 102.

24

and

to

move

to higher standards.

on the other hand, put

less strains

on

While
the

environment and the

from the private

infrastructure.

sector.

25

Initiatives in this direction are

most

The development of the following years showed

likely to

come

that day-visitors

from the northern neighbor Finland who make use
of the price differences between the

two

countries, account for

most of the

While they contribute considerably

tourists.

to the

foreign currency earnings of the Estonian economy,
they are surely not clients on which

a flourishing tourism industry can be founded 26

The

results

.

of 50 years of socialist regimes were discernible not only

in the material

condition of the country, but also in the psychological condition
of its people. Like individuals in

all

former socialist countries, regardless of their ethnic background, Estoni-

ans were psychologically affected by the centralized system. The country was
pervaded

by a lack of incentives and motivation

economic freedom. These
ers

had been taken from

tives,

day.

their

economic

were most

The

own piece of land and

effects of this agrarian reorganization

which were subsequently reclaimed by

usual for Europe

-

the

woodlands

The land reform

their

"
26
27

own

share of the production

See World Bank (1993),

p.

facilities.

own

The farm-

be spotted in the landscape

that the

225.

p. 3.

25

to-

abandoning of

phenomenon very un-

doubled over the decades of Soviet

left

numerous highly specialized

share of the land and, if lucky, with

The new independent farmer, maybe a

See Jaakson (1996), pp. 625-26
See Lieven (1993),

still

the forest, led to a

independence

‘workers of the agrarian industry’ with their

by the absence of

transferred to large state coopera-

were so extensive

in Estonia nearly

that followed

activity, created

visible in the agricultural sector.

and the decaying remnants of their houses can

fields,

rule.

effects

for

for-

mer

tractor repair technician,

activities related to farming,

product marketing

was now suddenly challenged with

the task of mastering

all

such as financing, input procuring, planting,
harvesting, and

28
.

Success will therefore depend on the farmers’
ability to quickly

adapt and to gain knowledge.

The

workers experienced for decades

industrial

sonal effort

would get them just

that a

system in which minimal per-

as far as tireless labor and enthusiasm,

which

left

them

with a passivity that especially older workers are unlikely to
be able to overcome very
soon.

Most of all,

helpless

when

were given

the managerial class

worked on an incentive

the markets were opened. Rewards,

for plan fulfillment, a rather static goal

them

basis that left

rather

which were hardly ever monetary,

compared

ment processes of the competitive Western markets

to the

29
.

Therefore

it

dynamic manage-

was seen

aggregate effect of industrial managers’ lack of adaptability to the

that the

new economic

order

poses more than an obstacle to reform efforts ” 30 as they could endanger the reform effort
as a

whole as they cannot lead

group of economic subjects

their enterprises effectively into the

new

that should easily be able, as a whole, to profit

arrangements, are the entrepreneurs.

First,

The only

era.

from the new

even the Soviet system provided some limited

opportunities for entrepreneurial activities, which were rewarded, for example, by politi-

cal influence or a permission to travel abroad. Second, entrepreneurial spirit

completely suppressed in the Baltic

28
29

Management. Another example

31

31

states.

See Shen (1994), p. 22.
Quality, for example, can be one of the explicit goals of an enterprise, as in the concept of Total Quality

every employee, as expressed
30

was never

Shen (1994),

is

the permanent

in the

improvement of the production process as

a goal of

concept of Kaizen.

p. 24.

See Shen (1994),

p. 24. It

should not be neglected,

in this context, that

ished on the black markets.

26

entrepreneurship always flour-

At the outset of independence, economic reforms
already had a
Estonia, even though the country

was

in this area far

substantial history in

behind the Eastern European

economies. As early as 1987 an economic plan,
mapping out ways

amount of economic independence within
support.

forts

As more and more younger communist

was received with wide

leaders, inspired

by the

liberalization ef-

of the Soviet leader Gorbachev, replaced the old guard of
hard-liners and advanced

into leading positions, the plan gained

forms and worked towards
to

the Soviet Union,

to ensure a substantial

momentum, and economists

their implementation.

slow down the process and

to water

Even though

down the reform

and a tax reform were carried out and a national

started planning re-

the rulers in

Moscow tried

provisions, price liberalization

central bank, the

Bank of Estonia, was

constituted in 1989. These changes had to be compatible, at least superficially, with the

old Soviet system, and are therefore hardly comparable with the radical reforms that
political

independence would

later allow.

intellectuals, a “semi-clandestine

men,

politicians,

and

in

group of scholars”,

more than one case

economic theories and became
tation of reform programs.

ers

Elowever, these early efforts brought together

all at

32

once.

who were

They entered upon discussions of

familiar with planning, policy making, and the implemen-

When the

time was ripe for the ultimate step, these

new

lead-

were not only familiar with neoclassic economic theory and the discussion between

‘shock therapists’ and ‘gradualists’, they were also very

lution as the

32

economists, business-

most promising approach

See Lloyd (1996),

to reforms,

p. 124.

27

much

in favor

of the radical so-

because they could study the devel-

opments of other countries which had been able
economies much

earlier.

28

to

embark on the road

to free

market

CHAPTER III

ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE CASE OF ESTONIA

A. The Twin Policy Goal

As

a country determined to transform into a market

economy

linked to the wider

global economy, Estonia faced the twin policy goal of
opening the markets to international competition

Union.

It is

and

to de-linking

from the centralized economy of the former Soviet

obvious that many of the new reforms would serve both goals. The prices

Estonia, for example, were in a

Soviet Union in the

Comecon

way

distorted two-fold, first

by the membership of the

trading area, where prices were artificially kept

world markets, and second by Estonian integration

in the Soviet

Union

prices differed from those applied for intra-Comecon trade. 34 While

had been introduced

in

1989 and 1990, the definite move

with the introduction of the kroon in 1992.

By

then,

it

to

in

itself,

some

below the
where

price reforms

world market prices came

was obvious

that this

move was

about to have a profound influence on the Estonian economy, unparalleled by the Eastern

European
possible

states,

much

where

first

earlier. It

measures

to

lift

was nevertheless

government was determined

to

do

it

price controls in selected sectors

had been

a step that needed to be undertaken, and the

a quickly as possible. Externally, the

movement to

world prices would create a terms of trade shock. The recession experienced

33

The small domestic market of Estonia makes economic development dependent upon an
wards the world markets. See Bradshaw, Hanson and Shaw (1994), p. 171.
34
See Hansson (1995a), p. 32.
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after

Rus-

orientation to-

sian price increases and cutbacks had
been a harbinger of what
nally, the

new

was about

to

come.

Inter-

price levels, ideally set at the international
market clearing points accord-

ing to the theory, would result in a change
of the importance of economic sectors. Given
the role of Estonia as a manufacturer of industrial
goods heavily depending

of raw materials,
industrial sector

it

was

predictable that the relative share of the national
income of the

would be reduced

ment process would be a
ertheless,

ing to

its

it

would

in favor

of the sector of services, and

that this adjust-

painful one for the people working in the industrial
sector.

lay the foundation for the adjustment of the Estonian

Nev-

economy accord-

international comparative advantage.

Another step which had already begun when Estonia was

Union was
omy.

on the import

the introduction of taxes that were closer to the

In January 1991, a 18 percent

tax, a social security tax, a

by a corporate

tax.

The

medical

local

VAT was introduced,
tax,

still

a

member of the

Soviet

demands of a market econ-

followed by a personal income

and the replacement of the enterprise turnover tax

governments

in the

ESSR were provided

with their

base, an effort intended to further decentralize decision-making and governing.

own tax

With Es-

tonian independence, the tax base had to be nationalized, which completed the disintegration from the

The

combined budget of the former Soviet Union.

introduction of a

new

currency

is

a task that the eastern European nation-states

did not have to accomplish in the course of their reforms.

To achieve and

rency stability and convertibility, however, were problems that

all

countries faced.

have already explained, the establishment of a currency board plays a

See Hansson (1995a),

p. 40.
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to maintain cur-

central role,

As
and

I

through

its

implications tor the general policy choices
of the government,

not only the crucial realm of exchange rate
management, but
other fields in which reforms were introduced.

form approach

is

it

it

determines

also influences almost

One of its main impacts on

all

the general re-

exerted through the provision to maintain a balanced
budget, which was

passed into law in 1992. Along with the currency, the banking
sector needed to be reorganized along the lines of banking in a market economy as well.
The Bank of Estonia had
to

be transformed into a true central bank, which meant that the
commercial banking

activities

it

had inherited from the Soviet era had

to

be transferred to other

institutions.

Probably the biggest task was the privatization and restoration of property. Even

shock therapists agree
esses,

and they

entail

would not be able

that reforms in this area

have to be gradual and well-thought proc-

an important regulatory role of the

to ‘digest’ the selling

even in the presence of foreign

36

state.

First, the capital

of several large state-owned enterprises

markets

at

once,

investors. Second, privatization not only involves strong

national sentiments and fierce political debates,

it is

also obvious that any solution will

undoubtedly leave some people dissatisfied and disappointed. In Germany, for example,
the restoration of nationalized property to

its

pre-war owners caused problems that have

not been sufficiently solved even until today. Not only were business projects and in-

vestments delayed by an endless stream of court decisions on single cases, which

slowed down the whole process of economic

among

36

the people, because

See Slay (1994),

it

restructuring,

pitted east vs. west,

p. 34.
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when

it

in turn

also caused great discontent

the former owners or their heirs,

who had

fled the

GDR decades ago to prosper in the West, showed up at the front

of eastern families and announced
Internationally, the

ESSR had

that they are seeking to get their
property back.

policies

were geared towards the

liberalization

finally

removed

moved towards

37

The

the last Soviet-era restrictions. After independence,
the

the conclusion of free trade agreements and towards
exchange

rate stability as well as currency convertibility to procure
the

vestment needed

to

amount of foreign

direct in-

modernize the economy.

B.

The Return

to

Europe and

its

Open Markets

In our present days at the end of the 20th century, international trade

structured

of trade.

already adopted an independent law on foreign
trade in October 1990, and in-

dependence
country

new

doors

by the neoclassical

trade theory paradigm,

states to optimize their aggregate

At the end of World War

II,

to organize trade relations

economic

the Western

utility

predominantly

posits that free trade allows

through global welfare maximization.

powers had

between countries

which

is

institutionalized these ideas of how

in international organizations,

which subse-

quently developed into dominant and influential powers in the realm of international po-

litical

economy. Most developing countries which had

nomic nationalism, socialism and

state intervention in the

direction in the 1970s and 1980s and embrace

37

The

is
38

the sine

Sachs and Warner (1995). The authors conclude

qua non of the

32

economy, have changed
policies.

their

The

economic growth has been empirically demonopening of the economy

that “the international

overall reform process”, ibid., p. 2.

See Biersteker (1992), esp. pp. 121-126.

pursued policies of eco-

now neoclassical economic

positive correlation between trade liberalization and

strated in

initially

principle of free trade

GATT articles.

installed in the international trade regime,
for example,

Both the theory and the

that is protectionist

nomic

is

measures

GATT agreement,

that enable national policy

sectors under certain circumstances.

open even

if

it

imposes some

country. Openness

is

restrictions

on trade and

however, allow for exceptions,

makers

An economy

by the

to correct distorted eco-

can therefore be described as

capital flows in

and out of the

not a definite condition, but rather a scale on which states
position

themselves through the degree of openness their trade regulations allow.
Generally, such
trade regulations are

exceptions or temporary departures from policy conclusions that

lead logically to the support of free trade ”. 39

The question why Estonia seeks
because openness
This

is,

wanted

open

its

markets

is

therefore quickly answered

-

presently the predominant attribute of the international trade system.

is

of course, not
to link

to

truly satisfactory, because

up with

the world in the

the shape to do so without suffering

fare. In the following,

I

want

first

it

raises the question

place, while their

immense immediate

to present

some arguments

why

Estonia

economy was

clearly not in

losses in production and wel-

that

go beyond the promise of

neoclassic theory, the maximization of economic utility and thus the realization of opti-

mal gains and wealth.

The

rise

of a desire for economic independence of breakaway

ized by the literature on secessionist

ation ’.

39
40

40

Krasner

is

been general-

as one part of the stage of ‘reevalu-

In the case of Estonia, a relatively developed region had assessed the advantages

(

1

976),

p.

3

1

8.

See Bookman (1993),

which

movements

states has

p. 37.

According

to

Bookman,

this is the first stage, the ‘before

followed by the stages of ‘redefinition’ and ‘reequilibration’, the ‘during and

33

of secession’,

after

of secession’.

of breaking out of a larger federation and compared
them
tion.

Behind

states in the

this

move

to the costs involved in this ac-

stood the general feeling that economic relations
with the other

Union were

unfair,

namely, that the slow economic reform progress
of the

Soviet Union was hampering the progress Estonia could
make. Similar perceptions can

be observed, for example,

in the reasons for the secession

and they also played a major
wants to

split the

of Slovenia from Yugoslavia,

role in the creation of the northern Italian

Lega Nord, which

region from the rest of the nation. The economic reevaluation
in Esto-

nia can be based on several developments within the Soviet Union.

of command economics triggered a rethinking of the existing

framework of communist

theories

by Gorbachev and

The obvious

failure

policies, first within the

his followers, then increasingly

outside of it.

The only model

available that

was able

neoclassical one, for several reasons.

nomic success and

to

promise an effective alternative was the

The West was

prosperity, if only because

munist world could measure

its

it

was

own achievements

the glamorous role-model of eco-

the only

economic system the com-

against. Other models,

employed by

developing countries in the 1960s, had just proven to be ineffective. Moreover, the success of the

new

industrializing countries of Asia provided a strong argument for the ad-

vocates of liberalism. However, the speed and the efficiency of reforms in the Soviet

Union were

insufficient for the Estonian people, because the sheer size of this

giant and the influence that

slowed down the process.
could not be

It

communist

hard-liners

became obvious

made use of completely

if the

were

still

economic

exerting substantially

that the potential for reforms in Estonia

country were to stay in the Soviet Union.

34

Without doubt, the most basic reason

and profound changes stems from

its

for Estonia’s willingness to

negative experience with

approach which has been profoundly discredited during

economic transformation and

the broad masses

fifty

this time.

formed a strong

could both perceive the dead end they were heading

for, as

embark on

years of socialism, an

Academic adherents of

coalition,

tor

went so

far that

which the Baltic

because they

they judged their situation

against the West. In the end, the distaste for anything that even
slightly
viet rule

radical

smacked of So-

even concepts of Baltic economic cooperation and integration,

states

would seem

early 1990s, widely discredited.

to

be predestined, were

initially, that is in the

41

This economic impulse for a ‘return to Europe’ was supported by the strong feeling
that the country

is

undoubtedly a part of Europe for historical and geographical reasons,

something that cannot be said of unambiguously of Russia and most other former Soviet
42

republics.

Another reason

for Estonia’s turn to the

economic considerations. The
curity

role.

As one Western

nia must convince the

ability to introduce,

43

See

that

at its

(1995),

its

se-

borders are concerned, seems to play

author reflected the feeling within the country: “Esto-

it is

worthy of being defended”,

If the country

43

by demonstrating

its

can successfully turn into a dependable and recog-

p. 26.

ibid., p. 28.

Wyzan

beyond

develop and eventually maintain both stable democratic structures

and a viable economy.

See Hansson (1995a),

West

that goes

of Estonian sovereignty, inasmuch as

problems with an unpredictable Russia

an important

42

fragile status

West should be noted, one

p. 11.
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mzed member of the world
it

and come

volvement,

to

its

if its

society,

can assure

itself that the

world will not forget about

assistance, at least diplomatically, if not through
direct military in-

mighty neighbor

once again. This understanding
try,

it

and they even derive some

is

in the east should

anchored deeply

sort

want

in the

to challenge

way

it,

‘moral dimension’ to the question of their independence and posit

Estonian author puts

and

relies

it

on some narrow

they ascribe a

as a test for

how

West abandons

is

about the future of their country, which might be, as

in the past, completely in the

sin-

the principle of democracy

selfish interest only, then they lose their raison d’etre “, 44

insecure the Estonian people

been

it

when

both in Russia and in the West. As one

is,

rather strongly, “if the

independence

Estonians see their coun-

of a Western obligation from

cere the rhetoric of freedom and democracy

its

hands of foreign powers, and

how deeply

How
it

has

they distrust

the Russian state, can be read from the following lines, written by Rein Taagepera, the

Estonian- American political science professor and candidate for the Estonian presidency
in the elections

Baltic littoral

of 1992: “The Baltic

when

states

[...]

belong to an ambiguous zone: part of the

ships prevail, but part of Eurasia

nia will last if culture and ships prevail over tanks“.

If

we

return to the concept of reevaluation,

tonia’s break with the East

came

finally to its

it

when

horses or tanks prevail. Esto-

45

cannot have come as a surprise that Es-

completion when the collapse of the Soviet

empire led to rising pressure on the economic and

political situation in Estonia.

nomically there were no gains to be realized from staying in a zone of high

zone where reforms were too slow for the eager Estonians.

44

45

Kanauka (1996).
Taagepera (1994),

p. 17.
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Eco-

inflation, a

Politically, the Soviet

Union

had

lost

even the

some Estonians when
gave up

of legitimacy that might have been

last trace

its

internal political struggle

became

still

present in the minds of

violent and

when

its

military

allegiance to the incumbent Soviet president and
threatened to crush the will

its

of the Baltic people.

C.

1.

Money and

Money
value, and

The Importance of a Stable Cnrrenry

Inflation

has three general functions.

it is

the unit of accounting.

pecially important in a market

It

serves as a

The

medium of exchange,

role of money as a

economy, where,

it

is

a store of

medium of exchange

in contrary to a centralized

is es-

economy,

goods and services are exchanged on decentralized markets. Compared

to the old times

of barter trade, money has made

our times, indi-

viduals of a country

this

whose currency

exchange much more

is

efficient. In

internationally accepted are in a

much

stronger

bargaining position.

Extreme

inflation renders a currency useless as a store of value, so people will hoard

basically every kind of non-perishable

commodity they can

get hold of instead,

which

leads to shortages, and consequently to severe economic dislocations. Black markets

spring up where people change their

money

into foreign currencies.

When

people are

willing to hoard foreign money, they exchange their goods and services for pieces of pa-

per that their issuers print

at

almost no cost

-

the inflating country

37

is

thus actually subsi-

dizing the hard currency area by providing

nance

,

capital flight,

An

future

and

economic

is

activity, present

efficient allocation

and

more

government

its

have

come easy

difficulties

helped to bring

That

is

usually a long-term

flow into a country where the investor can expect that his

value through high inflation.

fulfill its

A credible currency, when ac-

function as a store of value.

for a currency.

An expression of intent by the

govern-

convincing the international investors of the trustworthiness of

their latest currency reform,

46

be willing and able to keep future inflation

will

hardly ever sufficient. Countries like Argentina or Mexico with a long history of

inflation

which

difficult.

Credibility influences the function of a currency as a

.

likely to

Credibility does not

is

set the incentives for

market data cannot be correctly evaluated, so planning

have no fear of inflation, can also

ment

disadvantages the domestic industries in the

because foreign direct investment, which

investment will not lose

tors

fi-

derived from confidence of economic actors, both domes-

is

rates stable

medium of exchange,
is

of ‘high

46

low and exchange

commitment,

level

be invested in foreign cur-

market economy, where prices

of resources are

international, that a

to

On the

no longer an effective unit of account, because the

distorted. In a

Credibility of a currency

tic

home and

inflating currency is

structure of prices

seignorage gains.

massive transfer of capital abroad

i.e.

rencies, reduces investment at

long run.

its

is

is,

and

down reform

in

more than one occasion
47

efforts

a very genuine argument

stable within the limits set

by

-

its

.

their lack

of credibility has

Countries like Estonia have no history

at all,

even for the Euro, the future currency of the Euro-

exchange

rate regime,

which can be

fixed, floating within a

certain band, or free floating.
47

See, for example, the evaluation of several Argentine reforms from the late 1980s until today in de

Baize (1995), pp. 70

-

76.
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la

pean Union,
stability,

critical

because

it

pundits point out that, after
will

have

earn

to

its

reputation

single currencies that will be absorbed by
In 1992, the

government

institutions

its

introduction,

first,

will be

it

prone to

in-

regardless of the history of the

it.

of Estonia, recently reformed, rearranged,

cleansed of their communist past and put on a democratic basis,
had not yet reached the
efficiency of a well-trained bureaucracy. Estonian officials, not
only in the banking sector

but also in

enough

to

all

other fields where economic decisions are made, were not
yet experienced

be completely trusted

to

be able to deal with the economic and

political turbu-

lence of the transition period. All these factors were strong hints for a rational expectation of inflationary tendencies.

for example,

increase

The

effects

of inflationary expectations are exemplified,

by domestic wage-setting. Workers base

on what they think

their living

demands

their

for the next

wage

expenses will have been risen by then. Expecta-

tions of future conditions influence today’s price settings, in this case the price of labor.

Expectations are expressed in domestic interest rates as well.

An

investor wants to

make

sure that his investment will not receive less interest than what his capital loses to infla-

tion. Present interest rates therefore contain expectations

rise

of future

of interest rates decreases the volume of investments.

country with high inflation (or

by paying a

risk bonus,

i.e.

at least

interest rates

foreign exchange by state authorities

weak

one, since

cause.

it

Most of all,

low

On the

credibility), will

above market

may be

inflation,

and with the

international level, a

only be able to raise

level.

money

While controls of prices and

a solution to stabilize a currency,

it

is

only a

only represses inflation and does not remove the underlying economic

it is

not really considered to be a viable solution in a market economy,

39

not

at least

if

controls, that

done on a wide range and
is

for an extended period

the restriction of foreign exchange,

may

of time. While capital

help to stabilize a currency be-

cause they reduce the outflow of currency reserves, they
do, on the other
the role of the currency as a

medium of exchange, because

actions, increase their costs,

and therefore eventually reduce

change

2.

is

undermine

they prolong the single trans-

their

number. Market ex-

then inefficient.

The Exchange Rate

The

side,

prices

as a

Nominal Anchor

on the world markets

are determined

by the worldwide supply and demand.

A small economy, which holds only an insignificant share of these world markets, is not
able to influence these prices. If a small

prices of

its

tradables, that

is its

economy

like Estonia

opens up

to free trade, the

import and export goods and services, will be exogene-

ously determined by the world prices, which are expressed in key currencies such as the

US

dollar.

that are the

tion

Domestically determined, on the other hand, are the prices of nontradables,

goods and services produced and sold

between prices
49

for traded

in the

and nontraded goods

is

domestic market.

Manipulations of the nominal exchange rate therefore have

on the

real

48

Work,

for example,

is

rate.

Due

to the relatively higher

nontradeable

in this sense, as are all

This distinc-

expressed in the real exchange

rate.

exchange

48

in general little

impact

dependency of their national

goods

for

which input does not have

to

be

imported.
49

exchange rate is commonly defined as E*P*(T)/P(N), where E stands for the nominal exchange
terms of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency, P*(T) is the foreign currency price of
traded goods, and P(N) is the price of nontraded goods. See Hutton (1992), p. 303.

The

real

rate in

40

economies on foreign
tirely

many

trade,

homemade’. For them,

the domestic economy,

small open countries find only few of
their prices en-

the real exchange rate exerts an even
greater influence on

which

limits the possibilities for beneficial

However, the dependence on externally given
the pricing system within the

that

is, if

the exchange rate system

tivity will

tion

economy

be

set incorrectly,

is

is

prices

right

not necessarily negative as long as

not well-focused, the incentives for economic ac-

exchange

distort

both the structure of produc-

rate is therefore

one of the most important

aspects of structural improvement especially of transition economies

Hyper-inflation has an

dampen

stable currency area can

domestic inflation

gime serves

It

effect

It

most of all,

of distortion.

An exchange

51
.

rate that is fixed to a

severe inflation in an open economy, because

to the inflation rate

as an ‘anchor’.

torted prices, and,

der”.

immense

50
.

able to translate world prices accurately. If not,

and misallocation will

and of consumption. The

is

monetary policy

of the other country

-

it

links

the fixed exchange rate re-

enables the private sector to calculate on the basis of undis-

it

allows the government to “put

separates the part of the budget deficit that

needs to be reformed, from the part which

is

its

is structural,

caused by

inflation.

financial house in or-

the part that urgently

Moreover,

it

constrains

the domestic policy choices of a government, because both monetary and fiscal policy

must adjust

to the

exchange

rate policy

of maintaining a fixed

rency or a basket. Access to international financial markets

rate

with a foreign cur-

is difficult

for a country with

an underdeveloped financial sector such as Estonia. The government has therefore no

50
51

52

See Nagatani (1989), pp. 147-48.
See Dombusch (1994),

p.

Eichengreen (1994),

23.

p.

238.
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possibility to finance a deficit.

The budget must be balanced,

means, such as the imposition of import

Committed

exchange

to a stable

especially since other

restraints, are not feasible for

rate, the

an open economy.

government influences the expectations of pri-

vate agents. “The exchange rate leads rather than
follows other nominal variables, such as

domestic price and wage inflation ”. 53
Thus, to ‘import’ the world prices system and some degree of
monetary

stability,

a

country has the option to use a fixed exchange rate as a ‘translation
device’, whose main

advantage

lies in its

transparency,

its

function as a key price that

is

daily observable, in

comparison, for example, to another possible anchor, the quantity of money “. 54 Moreover,

it is

observed that even pricing agents whose products are not internationally tradable

often follow the signals given by the exchange rate

anchors even non-tradable goods, which increases
ports the theory

-

down

it is

rate

was used

where

it

to evaluate

55
56
57

how this

I

have

left

out here

was found

that in

56
.

-,

rates that

p. 67.

See Dombusch and Fischer (1986).
in Eichengreen (1994),

42

p. 74,

when

“history

have broken down”.

Bruno (1991), p. 23.
See Bruno (1993), p. 222.
Giancarlo Gandolfo, as quoted

- let

the theoretical discussion

fixed exchange rate can be maintained,

of irrevocable commitments to fixed exchange

See Corden (1995),
54

as the nominal anchor

it

does no longer cause serious dislocations of the economy

alone the political consequences which

full

effectiveness. Empirical data sup-

decided that a fixed exchange should be implemented to bring inflation

to a level

moves on

its

In such a case, the exchange rate

review of the history of sharp disinflations,

in a

most cases the exchange

Once

55
.

footnote 28.

57

is

EL

1.

Central

The
the

cal

central

power, and

The

was

bank of a country

its

is

usually the authority which supplies the

central position as the

ability to refinance

why

the reason

modem central

the central

Currency Stability

Rank

economy. This

bills

Institutions for

is

for

for

its politi-

commercial banks by rediscounting commercial

evolved over time into

it

bank

bank of the government accounts

money

its

present role as the bankers’ bank.

usually part of a so-called two-tier system, which

bank does not perform functions of a commercial bank.

It

means

58

that

particularly does

not deal with the private sector. The balance sheet of a ‘typical’ central bank can thus be
simplified, so that

its liabilities

bank reserves, which

consist of the currency in circulation and the commercial

are funds that

commercial banks deposit

sets are the net foreign currency assets

and the central bank

at the central

credit.

central

bank are called the monetary

base.

banks,

we have

money’ of an economy. This

the so-called ‘broad

to depict the three

ways

in

Combined with

which money can be

created.

the credit of the commercial

The

simplification allows us

first is

the sale of foreign

Its

does the amount of currency circulating

The second way

central

bank

credit.

Since the bank

only lending to the public sector

See Goodhart (1992),

p.

is

net foreign assets increase, as

is

not conducting commercial business,

or, in

Its as-

These assets of the

currency to the central bank, for example by exporters.

in the country.

bank.

the granting of

it

is

generally

cases of emergency, to commercial banks. Credits

322.

43

to the

government are therefore the second way

to

expand the money supply. The

two cases involve an expansion of the monetary base
and
tral

are in direct control of the cen-

bank. The third way, the expansion of credits given
out by commercial banks, can be

influenced by the central bank through a

banks are the required

to

‘minimum

positors and lends

bank, the

it

out. If a part

maximum bank

or decreasing

reserve’ provision.

Commercial

keep a certain amount of their cash reserves with the
central

bank. The principal function of a commercial bank

tral

first

R the central

is

R of these deposits

that

is

it

collects the

money of the

de-

required to be kept with the cen-

credit equals the total deposits

minus R, and by increasing

bank can influence the development of the broad money

ac-

cordingly.

A typical central bank also has functions that go beyond the supply of money for the
economy and

the control of commercial bank reserves.

They

are quickly noted here be-

cause they will play a role in the following discussion of the monetary system of Estonia.

As mentioned

earlier, the central

bank can serve as the Tender of last

resort’

by providing

short-term credit for banks or public enterprises in distress. While this provision un-

doubtedly has beneficial effects in the case of a banking

crisis,

followed by a severe disruption of the national economy,

it

which

is

almost always

can also serve as a gateway

for a politically motivated rescue mission of inefficient banks

and

state enterprises. Fur-

thermore, a central bank gives economic advise to the government and provides several
technical services important for an efficient monetary system, such as a clearing system

for checks.
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It is

obvious, from this brief recapitulation of the
interrelationship between the central

bank and the money supply of an economy, and ultimately
one of the main reasons

that

bank

officials are

for inflation

the stability of the currency,

a ‘political’ one,

is

it

induced to deviate from a policy of currency

occurs

when

the central

stability. In countries

limited access to international capital markets, such as Estonia,
the government
to finance

its

deficit

come from money

by issuing bonds.

It is

therefore forced to rely

creation, the so-called inflation tax. Since this

finance government expenditures,

it

can be viewed as a

tax.

is

on expanding

with

unable

its in-

income can be used

As observed

in the case

to

of

Russia, most of the flexibility in monetary policy that a central bank theoretically
has,

subordinated to deficit finance.

The

ideal

macroeconomic goals independent from
as a

means

of an unpolitical central bank, which pursues

politicians

(who

for the goals of their party or their electorate),

mediately in a society in transition from

communism

of power relations, personal friendship and nepotism
stacle is the fact that a central

the

economy,

is

an

bank with

its

to

are naturally inclined to use

is

democracy, where old structures

may

still

be in place.

multiple functions and

institution that requires a large

be able

run a central bank.

59

See Hanke, Jonung and Schuler (1993),

p. 36.
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its

A

further ob-

important role in

number of personnel, and most of all,

discussion of Estonian monetary reform that the country, with

at least for the first years not

it

unlikely to be obtained im-

personnel with the proper amount of knowledge and experience.

banking, will

is

to

It

was understood

its fifty

in the

years of socialist

provide adequate staff to effectively

It

should be kept in mind that economic theory

whether monetary policy
because they regard

it

is

beneficial in the first place.

as a tool to

pursuit of

count

different,

low

at the

is

countries

make use of it,

within the economy. In this

usually to keep the

economy

in the balance

low unemployment, economic growth and a balanced current

constitute.

cretionary policy can be

exist

Most

and sometimes diametrically opposed economic goals
which the

inflation,

same time

divided over the question

make minor adjustments

context, the general goal of a government

between the

itself is

However,

drawn from

at least three different

arguments against

different schools of economic thought 60
.

between the implementation of a policy and the moment when

its

effects

Time
on

ac-

dis-

lags

the

market can be observed, which renders the policy distorting or even counterproductive.

Economic

actors can anticipate the actions of a central

which means

that

bank and

will try to profit

from

it,

most policy changes not only lack the important element of surprise,

they also produce counteractions that offset their effects. In a study based on rational expectation models,

it is

shown

that “a

regime with discretion has an inherent inflationary

bias relative to the equilibrium policy with

can credibly commit

cism posits
because

it

itself to

monetary

60
61

62

stability,

61

An

independent central bank

prevents markets from finding and adjusting to

is

A third criti-

a dependent one cannot.

that central banking, similar to central planning in an

assumption of this kind of criticism
training

commitments ”.

new

that planners, regardless

economy,

is

harmful

price equilibria.

of how

and economic experience they might have, cannot have

The

basic

much academic

sufficient

knowledge

For the following, see Hanke, Jonung and Schuler (1993), pp. 38-39.
Persson and Tabellini (1989),

Remember

p. 31.

that the ability to credibly

commit oneself is

the ability to voluntarily limit one’s [policy]

choices. See Schelling (1963), p. 137-39, see also pp. 160-161.
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about the future to be able to choose policies that
are actually beneficial. Even

moderate

this criticism

be effective,

officials

this

if

we

and concede our economic decision makers
enough knowledge

argument against monetary policy

still

to

holds true for the inexperienced

of an Estonian central bank.

A fixed exchange rate is not institutionalized,
able to keep the

interest rates

enced by

money supply under

by the

politics.

central bank,

control.

becomes a

it

is

only defended

if

the central bank

is

A change of policy, such as the change of

political decision the

more

the

bank

is influ-

Ultimately an exchange rate might not be defended because political

considerations do not allow for appropriate measures, and the exchange rate collapses

due

to decisions that did not originate in the

For an exchange

rate to

market

63
.

be stable, independence of the central bank

is

only a necessary

condition, not a sufficient one. For persistent, long-term stability a public consensus

needed

that

would not allow any government, be

pursue policies that endanger monetary

might serve as a prominent example.

stability.

it

from the

The monetary

when

they criticize

flation at

two

it

stability

of Germany

When

the current policy of the

politicians or economists in

Bundesbank

is

too

strict,

and

for subjecting all other policy goals to the goal of keeping the in-

percent, they

maximum that

the center or the right, to

A hyper-inflation and two currency reforms in this

century have created a strong desire for sound money.

Germany argue about whether

left,

is

is tolerable.

may

envision an inflation rate of four to five percent as the

Which

is still

something many other countries would be de-

lighted of.

See Hanke, Jonung and Schuler (1993),

p. 26.
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2.

Currency Board

The advantage of a currency board over a
change

is

rate defense

nowadays used

nally the

mechanism, which

is

bank

lies in its institutionalized
ex-

almost mechanical. The term ‘currency
board’

to describe a certain type

name of the

central

of fixed exchange

rate system. It

was

origi-

central institution if this system, that is the
authority in charge of

running the exchange rate mechanism. In the following,

I

will use the term ‘currency

board’ for both the system and the institution.

The currency board

issues notes and coins and converts

rency at any time and up to any amount

at a fixed

it

exchange

into a certain foreign cur-

rate.

The board does not give

out loans, so that 100 per cent of its circulating notes and coins are backed by
reserves in
the foreign currency. Since one of the

convertibility,

posits with

it

is

main

features of the local currency

is its

unlimited

as sound as the foreign currency. In an ‘orthodox’ currency board, de-

commercial banks do not have

obliged to redeem them.

As we

to

be backed by reserves, and the board

will see in the next chapter, Estonia is to

some

is

not

extent an

exception to this principle.

The
old and

issue department has very

damaged

and liquid
tive

notes,

securities,

monetary policy

and

it

few

tasks.

It

buys and

sells the

currency and sorts out

invests the currency reserves in interest-bearing, secure

denominated

in the reserve currency.

to influence the

economic

trend.

The board cannot employ

Attempts to control the

ac-

interest

rates translate sooner or later into changes of the foreign currency reserves. Therefore, the

currency board does not allow for such interventions, and as a consequence, interest rates

48

and the yield curve are market determined
sort

because

either,

Demand and

it

64
.

The board cannot serve

as ‘lender of last re-

cannot provide unlimited cash.

supply

at the

exchange market are the only factors

that determine the de-

velopment of the money supply. Basically, the money
supply mirrors closely the devel-

opment of the foreign
is

trade sector.

The

current account of the balance of payments,
that

the balance of imports and exports of goods, services
and unilateral payments over a

given period of time, determines the growth or decline of the
monetary basis on a “oneto-one relationship ”.

65

As

I

have mentioned above, deposits with the commercial banking

system are part of the money supply as well, and

this fact alters the relationship.

When

a

current account deficit, for example, shortens the monetary base, the commercial
banks
are forced to reduce their credits.

The cash

reserves they keep in their vaults and the re-

serves kept with the currency board can be used as a ‘buffer’ in this situation. Adjustment

of the volume of credit would then only be necessary

it

of extreme or persistent

While the dependence of the money supply on external

contraction.

ited,

in periods

does not eradicate completely the main argument that

board. If a country

prone to severe external shocks, that

is

is

factors is thus lim-

made

is, if its

against a currency

exports depend on

only a few products, then a crash in world prices or a crop failure would largely wipe out
the currency reserves of the country, and the following contraction of the

would lead

bank crashes, which

to

in turn

would

intensify the crisis.

money supply

However,

it

reasonably assumed that any country with an undiversified export structure and

can be

little

ac-

cess to international capital markets will find itself in serious economic trouble in such a

64
65

See Bennett

(

1

994), p. 99.
1

Walters and Hanke (1992),

p.

560.

49

case, regardless of its type of monetary
regime. Moreover, the foreign trade
of Estonia

diversified

enough

that such a scenario is irrelevant.

More important

is

the development of the broad

money, which depends

rather

on

long-term determinants, such as the currency-deposit
ratio the public chooses to hold

Obviously, the higher the percentage of the

bank accounts,

that

commercial banks
to lend out

money

is,

for the

the

will

more

total circulating

be able to hand

out.

Another factor

The

economy

is

ability

is,

is

to

66
.

currency the public stores in

the public trusts in the banking sector, the

instead of building up reserves, that

situation to be stable.

money

is

more

credit the

the willingness of the banks

what extent they judge the

of a currency board to supply a sufficient amount of

therefore correlated with the existence, or the successful de-

velopment, of an efficient banking and financing

sector.

A long-term factor which influences the monetary base is the autonomous capital inflow, the foreign direct investments, which will depend on

rated internationally as an investment opportunity

on an expansion of the monetary base

67
.

The

are determined

how highly

the country

is

effects that this cash inflow has

by how much of it

is

spent to buy

foreign consumer goods and will therefore flow out of the country again.

The choice
currency

it is

to

implement a currency board peg instead of directly using the foreign

pegged

to lies not only in the fact that

own

its

sovereignty by printing

its

ily

used items of everyday

life.

government, because

66
67

it

it

allows the country to demonstrate

national heroes and symbols

More

importantly,

it

on one of the most heav-

provides a source of income for the

allows for a special kind of seignorage The foreign currency the

See Walters and Hanke (1992),
See the discussion of ‘country

p.

560.

risk’ in

chapter V.E).
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government receives from the public

in

exchange for

interest-free

bonds called the

local

currency, can be invested in interest-bearing
bonds on the international capital market.

The proceeds of this version of seignorage
rency board.

It is

actually exceed the costs incurred

estimated that the costs of a currency board are
generally

percent of its reserves, while

it

can reasonably be assumed that the

through them on the international capital markets

The main advantage of a currency board
rules governing

it

is

about one

earned

substantially higher.

lies definitely in its simplicity.

The laws and

are easily understandable and therefore difficult to manipulate.

currency board provides a
the monitoring of how

its

much

this reason, the question

legal provisions are

of the

The

higher transparency than a central bank. This facilitates

met and

policies

international financial analysts and investors and protects

eminent

interest

at

by the cur-

political

in a currency board. Since

it

which the government might be able

it

by the public as well as by

from

political pressure

independence of the central bank

limits policy choices,

it

to influence the actions

is

68
.

For

less pre-

also limits the extent to

of the board. While the de-

gree of independence of a central bank can be measured by an examination of its legal

framework, for example, by asking who appoints or dismisses the central bank
or

who

has the

last

word

board cannot be forced

if

to

officials,

government and bank have differing opinions, the currency

work

against

its

own principles,

formal and material independence bestowed upon

See Hanke, Jonung and Schuler (1993),

p. 9.
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its

regardless of the degree of

members.

CHAPTER IV

THE ESTONIAN CURRENCY BOARD

A. The Preliminaries

Along with
the

making

the general plans for reforms, drafts for a national
currency had been in

for a long time.

The banking law adopted

newly created Bank of Estonia

was

clearly understood

introduced

if

by the

(Eesti

political

start

instructed the

preparations for a currency reform.

and economic actors

to the reform.

It

kroon could only be

that the

A profound restructuring of the formerly

banking sector was only one of many measures

However,

December 1989

the basic regulations for both the institutional and economic framework had

been carefully implemented prior
socialist

Pank) to

in

the political and

for a sovereign currency

that

had

to

be undertaken

economic collapse of the Soviet Union meant

became urgent

faster than the reforms could

that the

show

first.

need

results.

The

rapidly deteriorating economic conditions pushed the Estonians to introduce the kroon as

soon as they were technically able
could ensure

stability

Moscow either cut

were

to

in place.

do

A

so, rather

than waiting until

provisions that

severe recession had been set loose in 1991, after

the supply of raw materials to the Estonian factories or started

charging world market prices for them. Estonian production

trap:

all

facilities

were caught

in a

they depended on this input but were also not in the financial position to pay world

market prices for
for the republics

it.

At the same time, Russia was also reducing the supply of ruble notes

of the Union, and

later the

CIS

52

states.

While the ruble zone was heavily

inflating, thus creating

more and more demand

for

bank notes

for

everyday transactions,

rubles were mostly kept within Russia, and
any agreement by the Russian central
bank to
cut back

on the printing of new notes was passed on

as supply shortages to the republics.

Salaries and pensions remained unpaid, or could
only be paid into bank accounts, which

unavailable for people in a system without checks or
credit cards

left it

gress in economic reforms Estonia had achieved in the
previous years

endangered

if

membership

in the ruble

69
.

Whatever pro-

was now

seriously

zone continued. Not only did the despised Soviet

currency

fail to

inflation

and cash shortage blocked most economic

provide the basic functions of money, the combined effects of its
hyperactivities. It also stalled the

reforms

-

privatization, for example, needs a reliable unit of account to establish the true
value of

property. Moreover, the monetary chaos seriously endangered what

was

left

of the

wealth of the whole nation. The Estonian public was eagerly awaiting the kroon.

The macroeconomic policy premises
economic restructuring over
Since

it

that

had been developed

the last years had

was widely perceived

now

little

that currency stability

in the preparation for

difficulty to

be passed into laws.

and convertibility would be under

heavy inflationary pressure

in this country with insufficient experience in

icy, institutional guarantees

needed

state

70

be

installed.

A law was passed

budget to be balanced, and as the “key policy decision”,

was backed by

69

to

a currency board.

See Lieven (1993),

Hansson (1995a),

p.

357.

p. 34.
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the

monetary pol-

thay requires the

exchange

rate

peg

B.

The

Ins titutional Set-! Tp

Estonia adopted a modified currency board
system, in which the functions of the

board have been incorporated into the Bank of Estonia,
which
regulation and supervision of the commercial banks and
the

ments system. To

was

is

also responsible for the

management of the pay-

board apart from the central bank functions of the Eesti
Pank,

set the

it

organizationally separated as the Issue Department, while the
other functions are

performed by the Banking Department. The Bank of Estonia
liament,

which appoints

its

is

subordinate to the par-

president and the chair of the board of directors.

The bank

is

independent, however, from the government. Most importantly, the balance sheet
of the
Issue Department, which

fore the control over the

government

is

amount of money

in circulation, is not

under the supervision of

authorities.

The commercial banks
est-bearing

separated from that of the Banking Department, and there-

minimum

are required to hold 10 percent of their deposits as non-inter-

reserves with the central bank. This provision

is

not meant as an

instrument of monetary policy, but rather as an arrangement to support the liquidity of
the commercial banks.

These reserves are held with the Issue Department and have

be backed completely by the foreign currency reserves of the board. This

from the

‘pure’ currency board,

where only the cash

not change the basic operation principle.

71

It

is

to

a deviation

in circulation is backed, but

it

does

allows the central bank to monitor and regu-

p. 77. For the same reason, the minimum reserve for the Estonian Savings Bank,
about
which ‘inherited’
60 percent of Estonian private individuals’ savings deposits from Soviet times,

See Buch

was

set at

et al.

(1995),

70 percent

(partially interest-bearing).
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late the

Estonian banking sector which was,

at that time, in the

middle of a profound

transformation.

The banking department holds

the excess currency reserves, that

is

the

amount of re-

serves of the central bank that are not needed by
the Issue Department to back

its

bank

notes and bank reserves. In cases of need, the Banking
Department can issue loans to

commercial banks as a temporary

assistance,

and

it

can even provide loans for the gov-

ernment, as long as they are not used to finance the deficit
policy of the

Bank of Estonia, however, has

Banking Department has

which means

its

exceed the bank’s

One of the consequences of this arrangement
Department chooses

is

to undertake to assist the

This scope of monetary

effective limits

to ‘buy' the krooni for the loans

that these loans cannot

72
.

that

by the provision

that the

from the Issue Department,

total foreign

currency reserves.

whatever operations the Banking

government or the banking

able to undermine the currency backing provisions of the board, because

sector,

it

it

is

not

cannot exceed

the currency reserves available in excess of the requirements of the board.

As mentioned

earlier, the introduction

law which requires the government
currency board, but

commitment

to

it

of the currency board was accompanied by a

to balance the budget. This is not a prerequisite

strengthens the reforms, because

monetary

austerity.

It

it

is

a further manifestation of the

keeps the government from borrowing from the

commercial banks, which would crowd out borrowing of the private
a country where financial markets were just about to be developed.

72

See Buch (1993),

p.

453.

73

See Bennett (1994),

of a

p. 199.
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73

sector, especially in

C.

On July
kroon. The

The Cu rrency Reform

20, 1992, Estonia replaced the Russian ruble with

new

currency was pegged to the

its

national currency, the

German deutschmark

at

a ratio of 8:1, which

can only be changed by a law of the parliament.

The kroon became
tion.

sole legal tender,

A conversion rate of

1

kroon for

1

which effectively barred the ruble from
0 rubles was applied to

prise funds, private savings accounts, and private cash

Larger cash holdings could only be converted

at a

1

up

to

all prices,

circula-

wages, enter-

an amount of 1,500 rubles.

:50 ratio to avoid the inflow of black

market rubles. For the same reason, private accounts of more than 50,000 rubles and
business accounts of more than

1

million rubles were converted, at 10:1, only after a

close check. Until the conversion deadline on June 30, 32 billion rubles had been ex-

changed

into krooni, 2.3 billions

exchange provisions, which

left

of which were cash.

74

The

effects

of these very rigid

Estonians with about $12 in cash (the equivalent of

1,500 rubles at that time), were alleviated, however, by three

facts. First,

most rubles had

been disposed of through shopping before the reform, or they could be spent

after the re-

form

exchange

in neighboring countries

of the ruble zone. Second, people could

their rubles for foreign hard currency,

but not

74
75

least,

which was

freely convertible into krooni,

most ruble savings had been heavily devaluated by

See Buch (1993),

p.

See Lieven, (1993),

446.
p.

358.
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try to

inflation

and

anyway.

75

last

The

convertibility of the kroon

account

at the official

exchange

was guaranteed

rate

for transactions concerning
the current

of the Bank of Estonia

76

Foreign currencies can

.

also be bought and sold at licensed
commercial banks. Since
capital flight could

subject to approval

change accounts or
this regulation

was feared

that

massive

endanger the reform, several exchange regulations
were imple-

mented. Export profits had

made

it

to

to

be exchanged into krooni, and capital transactions
were

77

Private persons were not allowed to open

.

make

further deposits

was hardly enforced

78
,

on existing ones.

which implies

that

It

new

foreign ex-

was noted, however,

that

volume and number of such

transactions were insignificant, so that the officials did not need to
act.

The currency reform paved

the

way

for the further success of the kroon,

supported by several psychological and material factors

79
.

which was

National pride of the

new

cur-

rency prevented a run on the central bank’s reserves after the introduction. The excite-

ment about
tance.

this

Many

symbol of national

identity

and sovereignty provided for wide accep-

have been told of Estonians buying new wallets, so

stories

that their krooni

did not have to be stored in the same pocket where the old scorned rubles had been

The

overall quality and appearance of the

ain,

was

also very helpful in creating public trust,

made and

easily counterfeited Lithuanian notes,

with the proper safeguards

76
77
78

79
80
81

new money, which was

Which has

to

be

set,

81
.

compared

whose

p.

to, for

example, the sloppily

producer failed to equip them

its

influence on

as mentioned earlier, within the three percent range around the 8:1 ratio.

447.

For the following, see Shen (1995), pp. 62-64.

See Lieven (1993),

printed in Great Brit-

This psychological aspect of money and

But were generally only registered. See Hansson (1995a),
See Buch (1993),

US

p.

359.

See Winkelman (1995),

p.

1229.
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p. 35.

80
.

how

people,

who “want to

bite into a coin

and

feel that

82
it

is real”,

neglected and discarded by economists, most
likely because
nevertheless important.

is

preparations for

was

it

83

The currency reform had

also

it is

believe in

it,

is

easily

not quantifiable, but

it

been well devised, with the

dating back to 1989. Very important for the
success of the

new money

the fact that the currency could be backed by
substantial holdings of gold. Prior to

the occupation of Estonia by Soviet troops in
1940, the reserves of the country had been

shipped overseas, and had been stored in the vaults of several
foreign central banks.
Luckily, these countries did not recognize the legality of Soviet rule
and did not turn

over the gold to the USSR. These reserves were
vided an

lion

initial

now

shipped back to Estonia and pro-

foreign currency reserve of about 1,500 million

USD). Along with

EEK

8 (about

120 mil-

the inflow of foreign currency converted by individuals and

firms, the reserves very soon surpassed the liabilities of the Issue Department

issue and the commercial

bank reserve

-

the note

deposits..

D. Performance of the Currency Board. 1992-1996

Within a few months of the introduction of the kroon, the currencies of its Nordic
neighbors Sweden and Finland were caught in a

crisis

of the

EMS. They

significantly against the deutschmark,

and as a consequence against the

The kroon could

one of the most stable currencies

82
83

rightfully claim to be

Dombusch (1994), pp. 241-242.
To avoid any misunderstandings,

ity

1

want

to

make

clear that

I

do not intend

EEK as well.
in Europe.

to posit that

can be obtained simply by issuing nicely designed and impressively looking
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depreciated

bills.

monetary

stabil-

Admittedly, this was due to the strength of the
deutschmark, but

and the

credibility

of this

new

currency, and

ance the currency displayed from the very

it

The

ruble,

boosted the reputation

brought attention to the positive perform-

start on.

As

figure

deutschmark was kept, and as a consequence the kroon was
well.

it

1

shows, the peg with the

stable against the dollar as

on the other hand, depreciated from 420 rubles per

of 1992 to 5,200 rubles per dollar

US

dollar at the

end

in July 1996.

Exchange Rate EEK / USD and EEK / DEM

EEK

per

1

USD

-EEK perl DM

Source:

IMF

Figure

1

:

International Financial Statistics, Oct. 1996.

Development of the

EEK against USD

and

DEM

In the beginning, the liabilities of the Issue Department were almost equally divided

between the notes

issue, the

but in the following, almost

84

see Bennett (1993),

p.

Savings Bank deposits and the commercial bank deposits,

all

growth

in liabilities

456.

59

was due

to

extended note issue

-

an

increase of the monetary base.

The amount of krooni

July 16, 1992 to 1,229 mil. on January

As mentioned

in circulation rose

from 630

1993 and 2,730 mil. on January

1,

earlier, the decisive factor for the

1,

mil.

1994.

on

85

development of the money supply

is

the development of the net foreign currency
reserves of the currency board. In Estonia,

they increased quickly

pecially in the

turn of money

By
to

first

-

due

to the credibility

of the board, foreign investments and, es-

months, the repatriation of foreign currency accounts, that

which had been

transferred abroad to save

it

and one quarter

issue,

to

Bank of Estonia were used

back the commercial bank reserves (including

those of the Savings Bank). The high share of cash, resulting from

1992, can be explained by the

crisis

of the banking sector

now

in favor

to

will

in

1

994,

when

bank reserves decreased

to

1

5 percent

is

able to stabilize, the

-

commer-

a sign that the banking sector was increas-

86
its

exchange

subject to differing opinions

86

and security of

liquidity.

a comparison of the purchasing power of the domestic currency with foreign cur-

rencies, the equilibrium

85

stability

the share of the currency reserves needed to back

ingly efficient in safeguarding

By

which induced

banks be willing to lend out instead of building up reserves. This trend seems

have begun

cial

in late

of deposits, which generates a

growth of the broad money. Also, the more the banking sector

more

growth

its

at that time,

people to keep their savings in cash. However, with the growing
the banks, the currency-deposit ratio turns

the re-

from the hyper-inflation.

1993, half of the total foreign currency reserves of the

back the notes

is,

See Gimius (1994),
See Buch

rate

among

can be determined

experts.

At

p. 1.

et al. (1995), p. 78.
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this rate,

-

at least in

approximation, and

both the domestic markets and

the national trade account should be in
an equilibrium.
the 8:1 conversion rate of the currency
reform,

market

rate

which was

of the time, the kroon was undervalued

tion rates in Estonia

and Germany

From December 1992

against the deutschmark.

88

practically oriented at the

in real terms.

87

The

differing infla-

set off this undervaluation in the
following

December 1993

to

A comparison revealed that, at

alone, the real exchange rate rose

months.

by 20 percent

While there are discussions about whether overvaluation
has

already reached a critical level

-

quite naturally, exporters say yes and importers
say no

one conclusion can be drawn. The

8:1 parity

was well chosen, because

-,

in the following

years until today the exchange rate did not reveal severe underlying
disparities. Other-

wise

it

change

would

inevitably have forced a re-evaluation and therefore a change of the
ex-

rate in the

The provision

meantime.
that the

exchange

rate

can only be changed by a law in the parliament

has received different judgments. While one side points out that the evaluation of the ex-

change

rate is

under

to the ‘unpolitical’

political pressure in the parliament

ing a

bill

mately

tral

87
88

89

90

it

creates

that

and independent realm of the central bank,

political costs involved

could decide about

and

should be transferred

89

others assert that the

with a change of the law create more security than

90
it.

it

It

can also be argued that the

political process

more transparency. One should be kept

in

if the

bank

of filing and debat-

mind, however, that

ulti-

will always be in the hands of the legislative to change the structure of the cen-

bank and abolish the currency board,

See Lainela and Sutela (1993),
See EIU 1/94,

if a sufficient

p. 16.

p. 17.

See Buch (1993), p. 462.
See Eichengreen (1994), p. 74.
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majority can be found

-

regard-

less

of where the competence for the exchange

ent the

bank might

rate lies,

and regardless of how independ-

be.

Shortly after the currency reform, the banking
sector found itself in a deep

crisis,

be-

cause the Eesti Pank could no longer serve as
a lender of last support. Several banks had
to

be closed or merged.

It is

important to point out, though, that

board that caused the banking
tor

was

in

crisis.

In contrary,

need of a fundamental reform, and

it

at the

made

it

it

was not

the currency

simply obvious that the sec-

same time

it

provided the Bank of

Estonia with a good argument to pursue tough reform measures.
Full currency convertibility

was achieved

eign currency accounts was allowed and the

during the reform

fell

-

in

March 1994, when

last restrictions

the opening of for-

which had been imposed

the ultimate sign that the introduction of the kroon had been a

complete success.
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CHAPTER V

REVIEW OF OVERALL ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE,

For the following review of the

effects of the Estonian

performance of the Estonian economy
board,

cator

I

I

data.

The

-

Way on the overall

in the years after the introduction

have chosen to concentrate on selected

which

1992

GNP

is

a

1996

economic

of the currency

macroeconomic

indi-

use to evaluate the performance of the Estonian economy as
a whole.

It

serves as an indicator for the success of the combined reform measures.
The inflation
rate is included

because of its strong link with the exchange rate peg and the currency

The unemployment

board.

apy, as

it

is

rate is a

good measure of the negative

presumably the strongest indicator

to discern

some of the groups

international trade sector

oped, which

is

is

included to assess in

nomic development

in the country.

I

Even though

it

attributed to Estonia.

as a

good

how

far

indicator for

how the

and the

is

which

is

It

interest rate,

from the

new trade

one of the major goals of the Estonian Way.

external shocks. Foreign direct investment

it

GNP

that are suffering

diversification of the Estonian export industry,

shock ther-

for potential discontent in the public

the formation of opposition to the reforms. Unlike the

lows directly

effects of

it

transition.

and

al-

The

patterns have devel-

shows

also the degree of

a measure of its proneness to

important for the future potential for eco-

have included an assessment of the ‘country

risk’

cannot be considered as ‘hard’ economic data,

international financial

and the progress of its reforms.
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community judges

I

see

the country

A. Gros s National Product

As

table 2 shows, the

GNP had been decreasing

sharply in 1991, and this trend

continued in 1992 despite the introduction of the kroon in
July. This result was predicted,

and accepted as part of the costs of transition.

steep decline

came

It is

to a halt in 1993, while the other Baltic countries

middle of a severe recession. In 1995, the negative development was
tonia,

and predictions indicate a moderate growth

however, that the

significant,

for the next years.

were

finally

it

in the

over in Es-

The comparatively

early and quick implementation of reforms gave Estonia a headstart over

not only did Estonia suffer a smaller decline of GNP,

still

its

neighbors

-

also achieved a steady reversal of

this trend earlier.

Table

2:

Development of GNP

1992

1991

1993

Estonia

-

11.8%

-

19.3

%

-

Latvia

-

8.3%

-

33.8

%

-

Lithuania

-

13.4%

-35.0%

Russia

-

5.0%

%

Source: EIU 4

/

The

-

14.5

96. t = EIU estimate,

difficulties researchers

culties others

have

later

*

1994

%

%

1997*

%

-

2.7

%t

+ 2.9%

11.7%

+

2.0

%

-

1.6%

+ 1.5%

+ 3.0%

-

16.5%

+ 1.0%

+

2.7

%

+ 1.0%

+

-

8.7%

-

4.0%

2.1

-

12.6%

+

-

3.3

1.0%

+

3.5

2.5

%

+ 3.0%

= EIU prognosis.

have with obtaining reliable

on with

1996*

1995

interpreting

it -,
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statistical

data

-

and the

diffi-

can be illustrated by the dispute over the

Estonian figures for 1994. While the Estonian
tained that the

economy was

still

Statistics

Department had always main-

in recession in this year, the

Bank of Estonia published

positive figures. This cannot only have been
due to political affiliation with the govern-

ment, because the EIU, an independent research
tral

institute,

followed the view of the cen-

bankers and showed an increase of 4.7 percent up to their
3rd quarter 1996 publica-

While the Bank of Estonia has recently revised

tion.

growth

rate

tive trend,

of

1

and

to 2 percent,

predictions for

one conclusion from

extract

continuation in future remains undisputed by

its

The growth

we can

its

rates

of the

statistics

appear to be rather modest,

all

if

1

all this:

996 down
there

is

to a

a posi-

researchers.

not disappointing, es-

pecially if compared to the two-digit decline rates in the early 1990s and the
widespread

enthusiasm and high expectations about the blessings the market economy would
92

bring.

Two

arguments, however, have to be taken into consideration.

First, the

figures for the Soviet period were surely ‘inflated’, because they were based

tion figures that

were distorted upwards by various

ment of quotas. Second,
ties.

Opinions on

formance

fall in

upper end. This

more than

91

how much the shadow economy

activi-

contributes to national economic per-

and the emphasis

lies rather at the

a further indication that the statistical data can not really be used for

See EIU 3/96. Imagine a dispute
actually risen

in

one of the advanced economies over whether the

GNP has

fallen

by a hefty four percent!

Admittedly, nobody expected Estonia to be the much-quoted ‘blooming landscape’, which German

chancellor Helmut Kohl predicted the former
93

the required fulfill-

show unrecorded and informal

a range between 10 and 40 percent,

is

show

on produc-

the confirmation of a generally positive development.

two percent or
92

the present data does not

tricks to

GNP

See EIU 3/96,

GDR to be by the mid-1990s.

p. 18.
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by

B, Inflation

As

was planned by

it

inflation

hoped

for

by the people, the period of hyper-

ended with the introduction of the kroon. However, a look

the inflation rate

only be

the officials and

made

still

remains unpleasantly high today.

Many

prices leveled off at world prices rather quickly,

domestic prices, especially those

set

by the

state like public transportation

state-owned apartments, are only increased step by step

penses.

made

The

price adjustments could

gradually, and the speed of liberalization varied from sector
to sector.

While most import and export

provision

it

-

bank cannot take countermeasures

As mentioned

the currency board. However,

it

earlier, this

to

its

income or

dampen

it is

it

one of the top

priorities

by managing

is

for

not significantly

is at least

stable at this

will decline further to an acceptable level within

the next years if the present economic development continues.

tion remains

in

to cut its ex-

inflation

should be noted that the inflation rate

generally expected that

and housing

monetary instrument has been sacrificed

higher than in other economies in transition. Moreover, the rate

and

many

whenever the balanced budget

necessary for the government to increase

central

the interest rates.

level

at table 3 reveals that

The

battle against infla-

of the Estonian government, because the increasing

overvaluation of the kroon leads to an increasing trade deficit and therefore to pressure

on the currency board and

the exchange rate peg.

However,

inflation rate in Estonia will remain higher than in

because the faster growth

in productivity in the

66

it

can be assumed that the

Germany even over the medium

developing country

-

term,

unlike Germany,

Estonia

rise

starts

from a very low

of the exchange

Once

level

of productivity

-

leads to rising

income and a

further

94

rate.

again, as table 4 shows, Estonia fared
comparatively better than

its

southern

neighbors, especially Lithuania, in the early stage
of transition in 1992 and 1993, due to
its

quick currency reform. In the following years, when
Latvia and Lithuania followed

with their pegs, the consumer prices developed

Table

3:

Consumer

1992
948

EIU 4

Source:

Table

35.7

4:

/

%

96. *

= EIU

Consumer

equally in

all

three countries.

Price Inflation in Estonia, Year-on- Year

1993

%

much more

1994

1995

41.6%

29%

July 1996

27.2

1996*

1997*

1998*

25%

20%

17%

%

prognosis.

Price Indices in the Baltic Countries

1992

mid-

end-

mid-

end-

mid-

end-

mid-

1993

1993

1994

1994

1995

1995

1996

Estonia

100

188

229

284

319

360

409

447

Latvia

100

203

247

284

317

356

389

418

Lithuania

100

600

820

1000

1200

1370

1610

1750

Source: IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1996; own calculations.

94

See Bennett (1993),

in this

way, there

is

p.

469.

no reason

He also points out that “to the extent that
why it should impugn the peg“, p. 470.
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a higher rate

of inflation

is

caused

One remark should be made

among

the research institutes

price a

consumer has

to

about the

reliability

who monitor

of inflation data. There

nomic

is

much

pay for a basket of selected goods and services

less

room

relatively easy to do,

Employment

terms-of-trade shock which followed the separation from the ruble zone and
the

sector

of prices led

from 1992

to a hefty 26.6 percent fall

to 1993,

of the output of the Estonian indus-

mainly in the state-owned businesses. 95 One of the most

striking results of the reforms, at least if one follows the official data,

rapid decline in production

ployment. Government

rate

was

cent.

at 2.3 percent,

The region with

was not accompanied by a corresponding

statistics indicate that in

compared

the highest

percent. Yet, in spring 1993,

the

unemployment

points out that

before

95

96

X is com

figures.

liberalization

trial

is

in year

for diverging interpretations than for
other basic eco-

C.

The

unanimity

Estonia about consumer price increases.
The

pared to the price for the same basket in the previous
year. This

and so there

is

rate in

it

See Gimius (1994),
See EIU 1/93,

when

as a

rate

was

the

reliable official statistics

Narva was estimated

measure

decline in

the official

em-

unemployment

with 6.9 percent and Lithuania with 8.5 per-

unemployment

necessary to take a look

it is

we can use

to Latvia

March 1996

the fact that this

is

at

to

town of Narva with

had not yet been available,

be around 50 percent.

how the

p. 7.

68

96

Again, this

authorities arrive at this figures

for the success of the Estonian

p. 15.

4.2

Way.

The
people

benefits for the

to take

sonable

-

jobs

‘at

at least the

unemployed
any

price’

below subsistence

are set

and keeps the wages low. While

people have a job and need not to

labor also causes overmanning.

level,

live

on

that will

is

in the

unemployment

to the official figures is directed at the statistical

methods

part-time working and unpaid leave into account.
ing

unemployment

benefits, for

which there

official figure, the ‘job seekers’ rate,

October 1995.

It

counts those

who

was

is

which leads

statistics.

the cheap

to

that are used.

are receiv-

A further

percent of the working population in

(EEK
it

many

They do not take

They count only those who

are registered at an

mum wage at the end of 1994), which makes

rela-

A second objection

unemployment

center,

pendent researchers estimate that only half of all job seekers actually do

from the countryside,

rea-

thus only delayed,

are high standards of eligibility.

at 3.8

caused by the low unemployment benefits

-

covered up. Furthermore,

tively high costs are incurred with the dismissing of
employees,

show up

may sound

be necessary for the old industrial enter-

prises to increase their rentability to Western levels

forced vacations that do not

this

social benefits

The process of structural reform

and the true extent ofjob reduction

which forces many

so.

and inde-

This

is

180, or one tenth of the monthly mini-

not worthwhile for people, especially

to travel to the registration office twice a

month, as required.

97

Furthermore, long-term unemployed disappear from the records of the local authorities

once

their benefits run out

and they no longer see a reason

to

show

up. Policies like this

are likely to create a major social problem. Because they are not registered, the ‘unoffi-

cial’

91

unemployed cannot be reached by

retraining programs,

See Sharp (1995).

69

and within time they are

harder and harder to place, which makes their
re-integration into the workforce

mately impossible

.

The data published by

non-official researchers

delivers only a broad range of estimates,

times the official

problem
tunities

is

ulti-

98

rate.

Unemployment

on the actual

rate

of unemployment

which generally converge around a
also varies greatly

figure often

between regions, “the biggest

not the average, but the distribution of unemployment”. 99 While
job oppor-

seem

to

be readily available

booming

in

Tallinn, the agricultural sector has to

100
deal with a decrease of the level of unemployment by 30 percent in 1993
alone.
Peo-

ple return to subsistence farming, the younger leave for the city.

The percentage of the unemployed

ethnic Russians

is

bigger than their share of the

whole population. Russians were predominantly employed
its

in the industrial sector,

large-scale enterprises in northeastern Estonia, because of its large

This economic and regional ‘bifurcation’

under control of the Soviet Union, due

-

emment

The regional and

did not install

some

sort

for labor.

90 percent of the industrial enterprises were

to their

importance for military production, while

Estonians were only 45 percent of the industrial workforce
structural problem.

demand

with

101
-

renders

ethnic aspects are inseparable.

of an ‘Estonians

first’

policy.

unemployment a

The Estonian gov-

While

it

was

correctly

predicted at the beginning of the reforms that the “dividing line between short-term win-

ners and losers will run close to the division between the Estonian and non-Estonian

8

99

See, for example, a Norbalt study quoted in

EIU

Labor expert Prof. Raul Eeamets, as quoted

in

100
101

102

See Burger and Lenzner (1994),

2/96.

Sharp (1995).

p. 40.

See Shafir (1995), p. 152.
Minimum language proficiency requirements, as

edly discriminating effects. They

set, for

example, for educational jobs, have undoubt-

are, however, not primarily geared towards the labor market.

70

population

03

44
,

should indeed come true only for the short
term. In other words, the

this

ethnic Russians,

who have

suffered above average from the collapse of
the industrial

sector, should also be able to profit

Unemployment

Bank of Estonia

also

for the

seems

to

above average from

be hitting

end of 1994 show

women

its

recovery.

harder than men. Figures given by the

that 61.6 percent

of the recipients of unem-

ployment benefits were female. 104

D. International Trade

Estonia has successfully changed

its

import and export structure, turning away from

an almost complete dependency on the former Soviet Union

Western European countries

(

see tables 5 and

6).

to vivid trade

with the

The decline of trade with

was

the East

not brought about by nationalistic reasons, the Estonians did not shun these markets.

was simply necessary

to find

new

partners, as the Eastern markets

became

It

increasingly

unattractive because of the severe recession in these countries and the fact that monetary

transactions

ferent,

to the

became

difficult

once the ruble zone was given up, the currencies were

and the banks were not yet able

to provide efficient transaction services.

The

dif-

turn

world markets was not easy, because the quality of many Estonian products did

not meet Western standards. However, the willingness of Finland to expand

relative

independence of Estonia from energy imports, compared

Hansson (1995a),

p.

29

See Sharp (1995).
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its

trade, the

to its Baltic neighbors

without

oil shale

mining

facilities and,

once again, the headstart from the quick

intro-

duction of the national currency laid the foundations
for the Estonian success. 105

Table

5: Estonia:

Main Origin of Imports

1995
in

Finland

USD

mil.

1,037

1994

in

percent

in

USD mil.

1993

in

percent

in

USD mil.

in

percent

33.51

%

495

29.87

%

250

27.90

16.84%

154

17.19%

%

Russia

449

14.51

%

279

Germany

285

9.21

%

165

9.96

%

96

10.71

%

Sweden

227

7.33

%

147

8.87

%

80

8.93

%

Benelux

155

5.01

%

74

4.47

%

42

4.69

%

United States

153

4.94

%

41

2.47

%

24

2.68

%

Latvia and Lithuania

101

3.26%

67

4.04

%

50

5.58

%

Others

688

%

389

23.48

%

200

22.32

%

100.00%

1,657

100.00%

896

Total

3,095

22.23

100.00%

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Yearbook 1996; own calculations.

Another incentive for Estonian firms
than from Russia

lies in the

to procure their imports

divergent development of the real exchange rates. While the

kroon appreciated against the deutschmark and dollar (see
terms, significantly against the heavily inflating ruble

105

See Gimius (1994),

from the West rather

p. 10.

72

-

III.D),

it

depreciated, in real

about 400 percent for the time

from February 1993

to July

1994 alone.

106

This development

may

also be

one explana-

tion for the relative strength of the exports
to Russia at least until 1994.

Table

6: Estonia:

Main

Direction of Exports

19 95
in

USD

mil.

19 94

in

percent

in

USD

mil.

19 93

in percent

in

USD

mil.

in

percent

Finland

320

16.55

%

233

17.81

%

167

20.75

%

Russia

250

12.93

%

302

23.09

%

182

22.61

%

Sweden

219

11.32%

141

10.78%

76

9.44

%

Latvia and Lithuania

194

10.03%

178

13.62%

99

Benelux

170

8.79

%

55

4.20

%

38

4.72

%

Germany

161

8.32

%

89

6.80

%

64

7.95

%

United Kingdom

161

8.32

%

36

2.76

%

11

1.36%

3.26%

24

1.83%

15

1.86%

%

250

%

153

100.00%

1,308

100.00%

805

United States
Others

63

396

Total

1,934

20.45

19.11

12.30%

19.01

100.00%

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Yearbook 1996; own calculations.

The

successful restructuration shows the effects of the world market as an orientation

mark and motor of the
however,

106

reallocation process.

The main challenge

to use the foreign capital for the creation

for Estonia remains,

of a solid and

reliable basis for the

(1995), p. 76. This process started with the currency reform, which separated the Estonian from the Russian inflation rate. However, consistent data is only available from February 1993 on.

See Buch

et al.

73

%

export industry, which will keep the trade balance
deficit within a manageable range in
the long term.

107

The

relatively high degree

of industrialization

in Estonia has

given the

country a promising foundation in the form of a diverse
sectoral structure of exports, as

shown

in table 7.

have much of a

Apart from the dwindling chemical industry, which does not
seem to

future, industrial firms

have managed

to secure

new

business connec-

tions.

If both the

and

its

economic

situation in Russia

and the

political relations

big neighbor return to normal, the harbor of Tallinn, could

between Estonia

become of increasing

importance. Already one of the best and busiest in the Baltic Sea, has the potential to de-

velop into a major link for the trade between East and West, and with

develop into a “veritable Hong Kong of the Baltic”. 108

Table

7: Estonia: Principal

Exports

1995

1994

%

Foodstuffs

16.4%

22.2

Clothing and Footwear

16.3%

16.4%

Timber Products

14.2%

11.0%

Machinery

9.3

%

9.3

%

Metals

7.2

%

8.0

%

Source: EIU 4

See Buch
108

/

96.

et al.

(1995), p. 154.

Economist David Hale,

as quoted in “Estonia:

Open

74

for Business” (1996).

it

Estonia could

E, Foreign Direct Inve stment

and Country

Rkk

Foreign direct investment becomes very important for
a small economy undergoing
the task of privatizing

its

large state enterprises, because the

amount of capital needed

cannot come from Estonians alone. The modernization of
production
that

new equipment, technology and know-how need

again a task that

is

accomplished much

Moreover, the trade account
that a surplus

on the

constantly lose

rency board

its

faster

capital account is

needed

if

not done by Estonians alone.

developed in the

to offset

implies

be transferred into the country,

to

and easier

deficit the country has

facilities

it,

last

years implies

otherwise the country would

currency reserves to a point where the exchange rate peg or the cur-

itself are

endangered.

International investors are seeking to ensure the growth of company profits.

They

are

permanently looking for new profitable investment opportunities, and once engagements

have been made, they are interested

in protecting their investment assets. In this context,

country risk assessment has developed as an important instrument to support the deci-

sion-making of the executive management

Country

risk assessment

encompasses the methods used by banks and firms

ate the risks involved with financial

count the political

risk,

109
.

which

is

engagement

in a particular country.

“the will to honour one’s obligations

It

110

44
,

to evalu-

takes into ac-

and assesses

aspects such as the extent to which constitutional rights are actually enforced, the degree

of social and

109
110

political stability, the efficiency

See Haner (1985),

p.

Krayenbuehl (1988),

37.
p.

25 (emphasis added).

75

of the government, corruption,

briefly,

political

circumstances that could endanger debt payment
or the repatriation of direct

vestments.

It

takes also into account the economic risk,
that

honour obligations and

economic data such

to incur foreign debt“,

in

is

in-

a country’s “ capability to

and comprises next

to the ‘traditional’

as liquidity and debt ratios also an assessment
of the quality of a

country’s economic policies.

Aspects of both the

and economic

political

risk are evaluated, quantified,

measured,

weighed, and finally rated, which allows for a general comparative
ranking of different
countries.

The methods used by

the different institutions vary immensely, the ratings of

the Institutional Investor displayed in table 8, for example, are simply
based on a survey

of the gradings of 75

to

100 top international bankers. 112

While the assessments of large firms and
nally,

some

ratings

stantial influence

it is

by professional

on

financial institutions are mostly used inter-

institutions are

widely publicized and have a sub-

the decision-making of internationally operating corporations. Since

an evaluation of the international creditworthiness of a country,

it

ence on the flow of capital into a country as well as the risk premium

has a strong influ-

it

has to pay for

credits in the international financial markets.

According

to the evaluations

of the international financial community, “Estonia

economic reform

star

performer that has practically completed

tion

and removing the government from day-to-day economic

country seems to have done

111

112
113

its

its

homework. Estonia

Krayenbuehl (1988), p. 40 (emphasis added).
The bankers in turn used the results delivered by
A ‘German banker’ quoted in Shapiro (1996), p.

is

in

life”.

76

a

terms of privatiza-

In their eyes, the

leading the other former Soviet re-

the assessment teams of their respective banks.

139.

is

public in these rankings, including Russia.
states (see table 9)

might be attributed

ranking behind the former

Its

to the political risk

Warsaw

emanating from a

still

pact

unpre-

114
dictable Russia and the comparatively small size
of its economy.

Table

8:

The

Institutional Investor's

Rank

Country

Ranking of Selected Eastern European Countries

Rating

One-year Change
vs.

March 1994

30

Czech Republic

60.1

+

4.3

47

Slovenia

45.9

+

6.4

50

Hungary

43.6

-

2.8

53

Poland

40.2

+

4.5

57

Slovakia

38.6

+

4.5

76

Estonia

28.9

+

3.5

86

Latvia

24.7

+

2.1

89

Lithuania

23.8

+

2.1

99

Russia

19.9

+

0.4

Source: Shapiro

1

14

in Institutional Investor,

Desinvestment

in

times of crisis

may

March 1996,

be more

pp. 135-139.

difficult in small countries than in large ones.

This as-

sumption, which cannot be explained with the rational models of international trade, is the reason why
small countries, regardless whether they are developed like Denmark or emerging like Thailand, usually
carry a so-called ‘exit risk’ independent from the condition of their

Martin and Schumann (1996),

p.

104.

77

economy

or their public finances. See

Foreign companies

which had been a

first started to

part of the

allowed for limited

Gorbachev reform

flexibility,

foreign companies did not

enter Estonia under the Joint Venture
Act of 1987,

However, the Soviet system only

and as a consequence the main wave of registrations
of

come

before independence paved the

The number of foreign companies

forms.

efforts.

in Estonia rose

way

for substantial re-

from about 400

in

1991 to about 3,800 in January 1993, with the biggest increase in
the months
currency reform.

number

by January 1994, can be

rise to 6,3 16

development of business

9:

after the

A second registration boom the last months of 1993, which let the total

vantages were canceled on January

Table

January

attributed to the fact that several tax ad-

116

1,

but

1994,

in the Estonian

it

also demonstrates that the positive

market met foreign expectations.

117

Euromoney s Rating of Selected Eastern European Countries
'

Rank

Rating

Rating

March 1996

1996

1993

Estonia

73

49.79

23.35

Slovenia

46

66.30

42.19

Lithuania

85

45.14

21.36

Latvia

89

44.21

21.70

Russia

100

40.60

18.13

Poland

58

56.53

35.78

Czech Republic

36

74.61

54.89

Slovakia

48

64.88

45.32

Hungary

44

67.65

54.92

Country

Source: “Japan Holds On...”

in

Euromoney, March 1993; Piggott

in

Change
1996

vs.

1993

+ 26.44
+ 24.11
+ 23.78
+ 22.51
+ 22.47
+ 20.75
+ 19.72
+ 19.56
+ 12.73

Euromoney, March 1996; own calcula-

tions.

115
116

For the following figures, see Liuhto (1995), p. 509.
This might also explain why, as Liuhto reports, between 20 and 30 percent of the joint ventures have

not begun operations.
117

See Liuhto (1995),

p.

509.
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In spring 1996, the cumulative foreign
investment

which
ita

is

USD 480 per head.

who

This

GNP.

1

is

19

by

far the largest in the region,

The main

account for roughly one half of the

ceived the lion

s

share, mainly because

cause the short distances

make

or warehouses in the capital.

The investment

EEK

8.4 billion,

it

investors

both on a per cap-

come from Finland and Swe-

total investments.

The region of Tallinn

most major Estonian firms operate

there,

re-

and be-

possible to cover the whole country from headquarters

120

statistics are distorted,

amount of Estonian money which was
banking centers. By

to

18

1

basis and as a share of the

den,

summed up

this process,

however, because they include an unknown

transferred back into the country through offshore

domestic investors can profit from the tax relief for

foreign investors and from the lower corporate profit taxes the parent companies pay in
these offshore centers.

The

121

recent development

shows

that the high levels

likely to be maintained in the future,

of investment of the past are un-

even though the negative direct investment

corded in the second quarter of 1 996 should be an exception due

to several large-scale

investments of Estonian corporations in other countries during this period.

emphasizes

how

important

it is

for Estonia to

come

re-

122

This only

out well in future country risk as-

sessments. International investment banks play an ever-increasing role in placing inter-

national capital, and this will

still

be needed in future, when further enterprises are put up

for privatization.

118

119
120
121

122

EIU

4/96, p. 13.

See Hansson (1995b).
As, for example,

in

Russia. See Liuhto (1995), p. 5 16.

See Burger and Lenzner (1994),

p. 79.

See Carroll (1996a).
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CHAPTER VI
PROSPECTS FOR THE FORMATION OF ANTI-REFORM COALITIONS

A. The

Unknown

Variable:

The Shadow Economy

The shadow economy encompasses every kind of economic
istered

and

is

therefore not included in the national income account.

not necessarily have to be illegal profit making. The most
self-sufficiency and

some

extent.

is

practiced by pretty

much

whole

barter

effects but cannot be recorded

Such

common form

is

not reg-

activity

is

Illegal,

but at least

economy, such

by the

still

statistics

veloped economies as well. For

does

individual

every individual around the world to

activities generate positive

to sub-

economic

because they do not cause any exchange

within the setting of economically positive activity are

moonlighting and similar forms of income tax evasion, again nothing

line

which

Spanning over a wide range, from do-it-yourself or neighborly help

sistence farming and a

of money.

activity

officially

between ‘neighborly help’ and

illicit

uncommon to

unemployed manual workers,

work

is

a thin one.

Not only

for

de-

example, the

illegal,

but also

disruptive for the development of an economy, are criminal activities such as smuggling

and the extortion of protection money.

The informal economy can be seen
it is

as a vital part of any developing

economy because

able to generate jobs and to provide income for sectors where the state fails to im-

prove the economic and social conditions. However,
like criminal structures develop.

It

it

also yields the danger that Mafia-

has indeed been observed that Russian Mafia struc-

80

tures have

few
and

expanded

regulations,

relatively

its

into the Baltic region, attracted

by

its liberal

better access to global financial markets,

open borders.

and

consumer markets with
its

shipment

facilities

123

Reported as the most flourishing

illegal activities in the

Baltic region are the smuggling of goods, the
smuggling of illegal immigrants from

Eastern Europe and Asia into the European Community,
the trafficking of drugs, weap-

ons and stolen

cars,

white slave trade and prostitution, and

Through

the proceeds

creasing

power and

cially

from

this activities, the

are able to

of laissez-faire

Extensive subsistence farming

is

laundering.

124

emerging underground networks obtain

undermine the society and

political systems.

money

to

endanger the

in-

stability espe-

125

restricted to the

unemployment-struck

rural areas,

but even in the cities the smallest garden can be turned into a patch of vegetables, and
chickens, rabbits or even pigs can be kept on the balcony. Exchange with friends or relatives

from the countryside supplies food cheaper than the

ant for the state

the widespread tax evasion,

is

“national sport“ in Estonia.

dustry provide

businesses

many

may

local supermarket.

which seems

to

The many small businesses and

Less pleas-

have developed into a
the

booming tourism

in-

opportunities for unrecorded work. Cash transactions in private

not be ‘made official’ through an invoice.

What

small country like Estonia can be guessed by a look at Russia.

this

It is

might mean for a

estimated that 90 per-

cent of all private sector transactions go unrecorded there. Only one out of many tricks of

larger businesses

123

124
125

126

is

See Ulrich (1994),

to

work with double bookkeeping,

p. 25.

see ibid., p. 28-29.

See Germanangue-Debare (1996).
Burger and Lenzner (1994),

p. 52.
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the unofficial one for the

own

re-

cords and the official one for the tax authority.

by

far better than indicated,

a consequence, the

and the standard of living

While people might therefore not
while

As

much

suffer as

many unemployed and underemployed may

living, or

may even

be able to drive around in the

as

is

economy

doing

almost twice as high. 127

economic indicators

in fact

latest

is

predict,

and

be able to eke out a meager

Mercedes,

it is

obvious that such

behavior on a large scale will eventually corrupt the whole society,
most importantly the
bureaucracy.

inflation,

Estonia

44
.

It

should be a warning

OECD

study notes that, along with the high

crime and corruption are the “most notable risks associated with investing
in

However, the

even of bigger concern

more

when an

directly.

loss in revenues

to the Estonian

Tax revenues

from tax evasion and smuggling might be

government, because the consequences can be

felt

are regularly lower than expected and planned. In April

1996, for example, the sales tax was 25.5 percent below target, the alcohol tax 31 percent, the tobacco tax

mil.

27 percent, and the estimated

monthly (USD 825,000

to 1.25 mil.)

-

the fuel

ered to be about 40 percent of the total market.

B.

The

The Unemployed:

loss in fuel taxes

smuggled

in

was

at

EEK

from abroad

is

10 to 15

consid-

129

A

Political Factor?

picture of masses of unemployed people in the streets, idle, dissatisfied,

maybe

hungry, cannot be found in Estonia, even though, as noted above, the estimates talk

127
128

129

See Shama (1996), esp.

p. 113.

See Investment Guide for Estonia (1996),

p. 15

See 011(1996).
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about

at least

one tenth of the Estonian work force without
job. This has

transformed into political pressure ‘from the

shadow economy
employed, be

it

that they actually

streets’, for several reasons. First,
the

do have some

sort

of a job, be

it

that they are able to

Second, they constitute a rather heterogeneous group
that cannot be

easily forged into a political

mands

and one

movement. The economic

in the industrial regions

are less likely to coincide.

The

situation of an

might be the same, but

situation of

unemployed

disproportionally affected by unemployment, the

one of the harder

women,

The high share of female unemployment can be
re-employment, which

is

due

to several factors

will

hit

groups in Estonia,

again

which means

that

if cultural traditions are reinforced

the independence

value placed on

now be

which has been

discussed briefly.

attributed to a preference for

men

First, sociological studies reveal that

new gender

by the

was not completely over-

preferences are likely to appear

nationalist tendencies that

accompany

movements almost everywhere throughout Eastern Europe. The

women’s domestic

in

130
.

the traditional classification of employment along sex lines

state socialism,

in the

their political de-

the ethnic Russians, will be discussed in the next section. Another
group

come by

however,

surely provides a certain income to both
officially and unofficially un-

live off their land.

rural areas

not,

responsibilities accounts for

strong

them being perceived

as

‘unstable employees’ with the additional burdens of household, children and, increas-

ingly, the elderly parents. Finally, there

nomic
their

130

rationality,

is

an employment argument based on pure eco-

which does simply see women not

employment brings with

it

that

company

For the following, see Fong and Pauli (1993), p 230.

83

as the cheapest labor available, if

kindergartens have to be provided and that

maturity and child-care leave have to be taken
into account.
ever, that the fastest

It is

also pointed out,

growing sectors of the economy, the services and
the

how-

light industry,

are the ones that have traditionally been
dominated by a female workforce, a fact which

might give
ues

women

a good chance to

become re-employed

if

economic growth contin-

131
.

Politically, this higher

tivity

with

it.

To

unemployment burden did not bring increased

the contrary,

all

throughout Eastern Europe a “dramatic drop in female

representation in the newly democratic formal political structures ” 132

was

become

‘tainted’ during the era

est in

all

groups receive a representation of their

accordance with their formal democratic

seem not

to feel the

need to

let their legal

fend and enforce these rights

C.

I

rights. It is thus

133

The

‘Foreign’ Element: Ethnic Russians

I

have

at several

times referred to the large group of ethnic

have pointed out several problems

133

See Fong and Pauli (1993),
See

(1993),

ibid., p.

p.

women

emancipation follow a political struggle to de-

certain regions, that they are especially hard hit

Einhom

concluded that

inter-

.

In the course of this paper,

Russians in Estonia.

had gen-

of state socialism, followed by the disillusioning

experience that even in a democracy not

132

was observed. This

attributed to the fact that active participation in the arena of formal
politics

erally

131

political ac-

232-33.

p. 58.

58-59.
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-

that they are concentrated in

by the economic slump,

that they

found

themselves suddenly as a minority
should be expected that
policies.

For

this

this reason,

I

group

in a foreign country after

may

Estonian independence.

It

constitute the fiercest opposition of
Estonian

will devote this section to

an examination of how the relation-

ship between Estonians and non-Estonians has
developed in the last years.

When

the Estonian people separated itself from the
central authority of the

also separated itself from the Slavic immigrants
that had been placed

during the

last

have shown above,

was of different
reality

its

it

territory

decades. In the search of an Estonian national identity,
the country

adopted a series of laws that sparked worldwide discussion about
I

on

USSR,

at the outset

their exclusiveness.

As

of independence more than one third of its population

origin than the Estonians. Creating Estonian citizenship based on
the

of the Soviet

era,

which was,

after all, a reality that

had been imposed upon the

country by force, was rejected, out of the fear that the naturalization of the non-Estonians

would endanger

the national identity of the country and

weaken

its

exclusive citizenship, adopted out of a fear of ‘denationalization’,

the general liberal markets approach of the country.

inner position.

is

The

in sharp contrast to

134

Modem Estonia conceives of itself not as a new state, but as the continuation of the
pre-war republic. This

1992,

it

was based on

is

why, when the

the law

Law on Citizenship was

which had been

for the last time in 1940. Citizens under this

cally citizens of the

new

Estonia, while

all

in place in

law and

enacted in February

1938 and had been amended

their descendants

immigrants

who

became automati-

arrived after 1940 were de-

nied automatic citizenship. The ethnic Russians, as well as the immigrants from other

134

See Shafir (1995),

p.

174.

85

Soviet republics, can apply for passports in
these countries, but few actually did
so in the
first

years. Thus, without any official citizenship,
they

between a
is,

status as a minority,

i.e.,

with

became

full citizenship,

and a

in the following caught

status as immigrants, that

with foreign citizenship.
Estonian had been introduced as the

official

language in 1989, while several years as

a transition period were allowed. Naturalization requires
the passing of a language proficiency

test,

which

is

a barrier for Russians who, even though they might
have lived in

Estonia for decades, did never really get to learn and speak Estonian,
mainly because
they live in the regions of the northwest where Russian

is

the local language.

younger Russians, on the other hand, are much more interested

135

The

in learning English than

Estonian.

Several other laws and regulations were passed after independence, and almost

them caused heavy

protest

from the various sides of the

political spectrum.

all

of

For some,

they were too rigid, for others they did not go far enough. Next to the language

test,

a

one-year waiting period for naturalization was required, which barred non-Estonians

from participation

in the

class citizenship”.

1

992 elections and caused a controversial debate about “second

The Law on Local Elections of May 1993 allowed non-Estonians

to

vote in local elections, but not to run for office, which consequently caused problems for

numerous non-Estonian incumbents
population.

135

The most

especially in the regions with a large ethnic Russian

controversial law

was passed

in

June 1993. The

Law on Aliens

Vladimir Chuikin, Chairman of the Narva City Council: “There was never any reason
we would be anything but part of the Soviet Union?”, as quoted

nian. ..Who ever thought

Europe (1993), p. 13.
Security and Cooperation in Europe (1992),

Congress Commission for Security and Cooperation
136

United States Congress Commission for

to learn Estoin

in

86

re-

p. 3

United States

quired that

all

post- 1940 arrivals and their descendants
have to formally apply for resi-

dence, which caused fear that

avoid a major

crisis, the

it

could be used as a legal ground for
deportations.

law was revised along recommendations made
by the

the Council of Europe before President Meri,

signed the law.

it

by no means
is

vetoed the

CSCE

and

first draft, finally

137

The exclusive Estonian policy on
is

who had

To

different

naturalization of immigrants based

from standard European

practice, but

the ideal approach for a country with such a large

is

it

on jus sanguinis

questionable whether

number of immigrants who have

obviously settled for good and are unwilling to return to their original or
ancestral

The approach of the

homes.
of as

many Russians

of all, the

as possible”,

fierce debates about

and who does

nationalists, that

not, has

drawn

139

a

little

tension

is

worth getting

the attention

in Estonia

from the

who

who

real issue,

deserves to be Estonian

which

is

the clarification

are not eligible for citizenship.

Russian rhetoric against the Baltic’s naturalization laws continues, the
statement of “blatant

Russian

human

rights violations in Estonia

UN representative in November

140

last official

44

and Latvia was made by the

141

1996,

despite the fact that both international

organizations and even the Russians in Estonia themselves are frequently dismissing

such accusations.

137
138

139
140
141

See Congress Commission (1993), p.
See Chinn and Truex (1996), p. 146.

Congress Commission (1993),
See Carrol (1996b),

16.

p. 20.

See Congress Commission (1995),

rid

has so far created more unrest than ‘success’. Most

blood and nationhood, about

of the status of persons residing

now

p. 5.

p. 3.

87

The haggling about

the citizenship question conceals the
fact that the real concerns of

the ethnic Russians are the economic situation
and the possibilities and opportunities for

them

to participate in the

new economy. 142

Estonians indicated that they
to 61 percent

felt that their

In June 1994, only 28 percent of the non-

economic

situation

had improved, compared

143

of the Estonians.

Elowever, while according to a survey conducted in

April 1995 about 30 percent of the Russians in Estonia
thought they would be better off
if

they were

still

144

within the Soviet Union,

this leaves a two-thirds majority supporting

the country. 87 percent of the Russians said that they have

and 93 percent wanted

locals,

rhetoric nor the

145

to stay.

economic conditions

It

still

not, constitute a

nist hard-liners

ket

the Russians

the Russians failed to

do

which

will give further support to less aggres-

146

More and more,

why

that neither the nationalistic

led to a radicalization. Furthermore, ethnic tensions

are generally perceived to be decreasing,

sive parties.

seems obvious

or no problems with the

little

become

politically organized.

become united

as one political bloc.

homogeneous group with

a

common

Three reasons are given
147

First,

they did not, and

sense of purpose.

Commu-

and Russian nationalists met with young entrepreneurs yearning

who would

get the people behind them. Third, the existing

Russian organizations, most prominently the Communist Party which had been

See Congress Commission (1993),
144
145

146
147

mar-

economy. Second, the Russian immigrants were predominantly technocrats, they

lacked the intellectual leaders

143

for

According

p.l.

to a Saar institute poll, as

The

New

EIU

3/95, p. 8 (source not cited

Baltics

Barometer

See Kaplan (1995),

p.

II,

quoted

as quoted in
-

in

Kaplan (1995),

“Them and

presumably the

New

Us“,

p.

Baltics

Barometer

258.

For the following, see Smith, Aasland and Mole (1994),

88

p.

258.

p. 74.

202.

II).

left

by

most Estonians, were deeply discredited
even among
October 1993, many of the Russian leaders

in

ship in the

Communist

moved from

office

-

the Russians. In the local
elections

most of them with a history of member-

Party and of open support for the
August 1991 coup, were re-

and replaced by a new generation of more
mainstream Russians. 148 In

the elections of 1995, three Russian parties
formed a coalition and
is

won

six seats,

which

well below their potential, considered that about
150,000 naturalized ethnic Russians

were allowed
interests

to vote.

which

149

This seems to be a sign that most Russians do
not have political

are diametrically

opposed

to Estonian policies, at least not in

economic

questions, especially since the Russian parties themselves
are far from being truly radi-

As

cal.

the focus of political debate shifts from nationalism to
social and economic

sues, Estonians

and non-Estonians may form coalitions based on similar

policy changes in their favor.

seems

It

to

me

is-

interest to cause

150

that ethnic tensions in Estonia are well

below a

critical level at

which

they might endanger the society, probably because demagogues cannot effectively
turn
the Russians into a scapegoat for Estonian problems.

general behave like oppressors, nor did they occupy

The Communists
The

148

149

150

leading positions in the country.

much

fed up with the old regime as were the Estonians.

suffered from the economic collapse, and they were both looking forward to

new times. The

See

all

in

and they came out of the Estonian part of the population as well.

ethnic Russians were as

They both
the

did,

The Russian immigrants did not

Estonian government seems to bet on the factor of time, in the hope

Pettai (1996), p. 79.

See Taagepera (1995),
See Kaplan (1995),

p.

p.

330.

259.

89

that

economic progress

will benefit both Estonians

groups might achieve some
case, the Estonian

Way

sort

and non-Estonians, and

of peaceful cohabitation through

that the

two

this process. In this

of economic reforms would have been successful,
because

it

did

not give rise to severe tensions. In the end,
integration should be a matter of self-interest
for Estonia, because an unsettled relationship
with

of worries about the behavior of its big neighbor

its

Russians will always be a source

in the East.

151

This, however,

is

not a

question of economics.

EL The

Political

L andscape and

Election Results

In the spring of 1992, the political landscape of Estonia

political parties possessing a clear political

unanimity.

program and a

was

still

certain

shaped by the lack of

amount of internal

A constitution had not yet been introduced, and the legislature, the

Council, was a remnant of the old Soviet Union.

lenged over the

last

Its

Supreme

legitimacy had been heavily chal-

years by the Congress of Estonia.

The 1990

election had left the

Council dominated by pro-independence forces that had very different ideas for reforms,
particularly

What

on the

the factions had in

tional currency

tion.

fiercely debated question of citizenship for non-Estonian residents.

and a

common, though, was

relatively

that they all shared the desire for a na-

good understanding of the implications of its introduc-

The Estonian government was headed

at that

time by Prime Minister Savisaar. Al-

though by no means an opponent of reforms, he preferred a more gradual pace and was

151

See

“Them and

Us”,

p. 75.

90

always trying

to

slow down the process. In January
1992,

in the political aftermath

of a

severe energy crisis due to a cutback on Russian
supplies, he had to resign from office.

While he remained

in the political arena,

ally

become a voice of the

that

would make

critics

forming a center-left party that would eventu-

of the market reforms, he was discredited to an
extent

his return to a governing coalition unlikely
for the near future.

The

caretaker government appointed after Savisaar’s
resignation could then draw support

from a wide

political spectrum,

to rightist-nationalist groups.

radical reformers

board without

The

from a moderate group of Social Democrats and

When the

and economic experts

need for currency reform became urgent, 152 the
in this coalition

could introduce the currency

difficulties.

first fully free election,

held in September 1992, about ten weeks after the cur-

rency reform, showed that support for radical reforms existed in the public.

ground for a center-right coalition
coalition

was

centrists

led

stable

enough

to continue the

It

laid the

reform process. The

by the Fatherland alliance of several Christian Democratic and Conser-

vative parties, which were focused on rapid and decisive reforms. Partners were the Es-

tonian National Independence Party, hard-liners in the question of the Russian minority,

but willing to cooperate with the reformers in economic issues, and the Moderates, a

conglomerate of Social Democrats and

ate

and

liberal.

rural Centrists,

The opposition was dominated by

which were indeed

the Popular Front,

mainder of the broad movement of the days of the struggle
cure

152

Home,

rather

moder-

which was the

for independence,

re-

and by Se-

party of the old nomenklatura and other people interested in slowing reforms

See chapter IV, A.

91

down.

153

Significant

was

the collapse of the reform-communist
Left Alternative, which

failed to receive the five percent of the
nationwide vote required to

liament.

was

It

also observed that the electorate

make

was divided between

it

into the par-

the urbanites,

who

largely supported the reform coalition,
and the rural areas, where personalities prevailed,

which accounted

for the large vote for the former

Council, Arnold Ruiitel,

who was

chairman of Soviet Estonia’s Supreme

almost elected president of the

new republic. 154

In the following years, the parties underwent
several transformations, and individuals

would change

their affiliations, so that in

October 1994 the government

fell

when

Father-

land split up into three parties. The caretaker government
relied mainly on incumbent
ministers,

which

elections shifted

indicates that the political support had not diminished.

power towards

the center, to a coalition of the

an uneasy coalition of protectionist farm

managers

44

1

,

” and the Center

Reform Party and

Party.

interests

KMU,

which

to reforms

is

in itself

and market-oriented former Soviet

The main opposition comes from

the right, from the

Fatherland, which are ideologically close but failed to join to form a

strong pro-reform movement. However, neither one of the major parties

posed

The March 1 995

- it is

significant that a viable

movement

left

is

strongly op-

of the social democratic

Moderates did not emerge.

The Reform Party replaced
leader Savisaar

ment, the

153

was involved

the centrists in the government coalition after Center Party

in a political scandal in spring 1996. In the latest develop-

KMU broke with the Reform Party again and

For an overview of all Estonian parties

in the first

155

See Kionka (1992),

Taagepera (1995),

p. 10.

p.

looking to form a minority

post-independence parliament,

of comedians running as the Monarchists, see Fitzmaurice (1993),
154

is

329.

92

esp. p. 172.

among them

a group

government, either on

from the

The

Centrists.

nomic policy can be
of the

its

by the comment of an opposition

156

The

results

on the plans

new prospective

sent the pension increase wish di-

of the municipal elections in October 1996

,

which

distribution of votes over the biggest election
unions and thus no bigger

is

new government

that they “will continue pursuing the

foreign policies as before“, 157 and the

the same“, because the “groups are

overall consensus

on reforms

In the last paragraph of this chapter,

Estonian government takes with
the guiding

to the

quite similar",

158

that the

show

that the

its

I

The Banking Reform

would

promises

like to give

an example for the care the

reforms, as an example that, even though shock ther-

model of economic change,

an unrestricted rush

all

comment

is still stable.

E. Saving the Savers:

is

breakaway

politician

to raise the pensions as a concession
to the

same domestic, economic and

apy

Party, a

influence this ‘coalition jostling’ has
on the overall eco-

change, the announcement of the

general policy

Development

“The Prime Minister could have

rectly to Santa Claus“.

showed an even

little

or together with the

illustrated

new government

coalition partners:

own

-

the

and deceits

-

government does not confuse

it

with

of liberal markets.

After the currency reform had limited the ability of commercial banks to refinance

themselves through the Eesti Pank,

As quoted
157

in

Tammerk

Prime Minister

Tiit

(1996), p.

it

soon became clear that many of the banks would

8.

Vahi, as quoted

in

Tammerk

(1996), p.

1.

Tartu University political science professor Rein Toomla, as quoted

93

in

Sharp (1996).

not survive.

It is

indicated, in a close examination of
the bank’s business practices
prior

to the crash, that the

tral

bank

to

back

its

When the

before.

commercial banks may have misjudged the
willingness of the cendirectives with sanctions, especially
since this

Eesti

Pank refused

would undoubtedly have caused
rency board, the banks became
winter

1

to bail out the

banks in

had hardly been done

distress,

an action which

the early demise of the exchange rate peg
and the cur-

illiquid,

and

in the following

banking

crisis in fall

and

992, the central bank closed one of the banks and merged two
others, while de-

positors and owners were not or only partially compensated.
In the following, eight further banks lost their license, and ten others were merged.
capital requirements

and

liquidity

norms by the year 2000. 160 As

were raised and are planned

rigid

minimum

be adapted to

EU

payment system was

raised as well.

approach has brought the country two years ahead of its Baltic neighbors

banking reforms, and the bad debt

ratio

of Estonian banks

the lowest throughout post-communist Europe.

It

to

for

a consequence, liquidity and solvency of the banking

sector improved steadily, and the efficiency of the

The

The demands

should be remembered,

when

is

nowadays with

in

4.7 percent

161

discussing the effects of the banking reform on pri-

vate individuals, that most of their savings were held with the Savings Bank, which did

not get into trouble during this

lost

efficiency of the

See Hansson (1995c),
161

Thus, even though banks were closed and investors

money, the general public remained

The increased

160

crisis.

See

ibid., p.

relatively unaffected.

payment system and the more

p. 150.

145.

See Linderfalk (1996).

94

The savers were
solid

and

reliable

spared.

ground

on which

the banks stood that survived the crisis,
benefited both the general public and

the risk-takers’, which incurred losses, but
were at the

same time rewarded with

the

prospect for better chances on financial gains in
the future.
It

can be observed that the shock therapy measures
employed

companied by a hasty implementation of all

was

set up, after

ronment had been established, and yet
change of the Baltic
this

new market,

it

162

states.

it

off. It

was not

1

private investors play only a

quickly, but not blindly, and that potential ‘victims of the

162

May 996

fi-

that the

developed quickly into the biggest stock ex-

emphasizes that the Estonians are able

for

until

ac-

an adequate infrastructure and regulatory envi-

Even though

wherever the reform plan allows

were not

the instruments of the Western liberal

nancial services sectors, and this caution paid

Tallinn stock exchange

in Estonia

it.

See Kaminski (1996).

95

to

minor

role

on

reform their economy

new times’

are taken care of

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

At

the time Estonia gained independence,

political

when

the country could set out to reform

and economic structure unrestricted by objections from
a

Moscow,

central

government

its

in

other former centrally planned economies had already
begun the transformation

process. Observing their neighbors’ experiences with reforms,
the Estonian government

was convinced

that

changes had

to

be quick and definite, that any

‘third

way’ would not

only be unlikely to result in a favorable economic development, but lead
directly to
ther

impoverishment

163
.

fur-

Independence and the economic collapse of the ruble zone

caused a period of “extraordinary policies " 164
cal reforms in the electorate

was

high, and in

in

which the

level

of acceptability of radi-

which oppositional forces had not yet been

formed. This was an opportunity to introduce the radical and painful reforms that were
considered to be necessary, and these reforms were indeed backed by the support of a

people

who was

their country

willing to endure economic hardship in the hope of being rewarded as

would become a worthy member of the democratic world and

its liberal

markets.

The examples of several developing and post-communist
macroeconomic

163

164

See Laar (1996),

countries demonstrate that

stabilization generally requires quick reforms, because inflationary ex-

p. 98.

Mart Laar served as Prime Minister of Estonia from 1992

to 1994.

This much-quoted term goes back to Leszek Balcerowicz, former deputy prime minister of Poland. See

Balcerowicz (1994). He
tions

is one of the most prominent academics in the field of transformation policy quesand a strong supporter of the shock therapy approach. See also Balcerowicz (1995).

96

pectations are hardly ever successfully
broken by gradual attempts. 165 Even
though the

present inflation rate in Estonia might be
very high by Western standards, there

doubt that the introduction of the kroon and

its

institutional

board brought a reliable and fully functional
currency

monetary

stability, the

Along with

same extent
tive picture

all

as

I

have described above

era.

economy

is

in chapter V.

reasons

way

Way

return to the

communist system

is

GDP today.

now out of the

at the

liberal

code and a trade code, led

end of the

market sys-

to a flourishing

This

question

is

one of the
166

41
.

not only political rhetoric. Extremist political parties from both the right and the
slipped into insignificance in the last elections.

with the statement

surveys, but this

“I

may

am worse

103

166
167

is

have

A substantial part of the people may agree

off today than under the old regime

Union

44

in public opinion

Moreover, research indicates that democratic

itself.

p. 34.

p. 100.

The statement “Let’s put up the wall again“,
Germany. However, such a statement

reunified

left

is

dependent on the process of democratic reform rather than on the eco-

See Slay (1994),
Laar (1996),

This

not be equaled with refusal of democracy or remorse about the de-

cision to leave the Soviet

commitment

for.

Debates about the accuracy of the data

which produces more than 60 percent of the

why “any

was hoped

led to the largely posi-

The quick implementation of the foundations of the
civil

it

of

have noted, but not discussed to the

growing, after the years of stagnation

tem, such as a reformed court system, a
private sector,

to the country. In the field

discussed the currency board, the Estonian

I

notwithstanding, the

communist

I

no

backing by the currency

currency board approach clearly worked the

other reform measures, which

is

for example, can be frequently heard in both parts
is

easily

97

made

if

one can be sure

that

it

will not

of the

come

true!

nomic
ticians

situation

and

168

Dissatisfaction with

.

their behavior

and

less

by a

democracy
failure

nate, in this context, that Estonian
politicians

tegrity

many

and altruism

in the last years.

Many

is

therefore rather created by the poli-

of their economic policies.

It is

unfortu-

have not always displayed a picture of in-

cases of nepotism have been observed,
and

times individuals failed to meet the demands of
a position in the government.

However, none of these events have transformed
political

into a level of dissatisfaction with the

system that would exceed the level of dissatisfaction

that

can be observed

in

Western democracies.

I

have shown

that

economic development has produced negative

effects.

This has been

expected, and even though the most optimistic pictures drawn

at the outset

have since been revised, none of the negative developments

dramatically outside of the

is

scope within which the Estonian government should be able to deal with
This

is

tial’

so

probably the reason

far.

why

ance of the Estonian national economy,

tivity

high

with

it.

among

to

some

There

is

it

is

that

tion of the Russians surely

is

I

it

economic

distress

also brought increased criminal ac-

hit.

Unemployment

have shown, the Estonian government

is

by deliberately discriminating against them. The

not an ideal one, and

sion in future, but most Russians

over the true economic perform-

some groups have been hard

the ethnic Russians, but as

further aggravating that situation

veil

also likely to ‘mollify’ the

extent, despite the fact that

no doubt

successfully.

these problems have not created a ‘revolutionary poten-

The shadow economy not only draws a

of individuals

it

of the reforms

know that

their

See Evans and Whitefield (1995).

98

it

is

not

situa-

will certainly cause further discus-

economic

situation

is

unlikely to im-

prove

if

they return to Russia, as the almost
insignificantly low rate of ‘emigrating’
Rus-

sians shows.

role of the

ter.

As

the country changes

woman

The agrarian

in

it,

sector

and

is

it

from

state socialism to free markets,
so

might, at least in

some

aspects, not be a

changes the

change

to the bet-

struggling, but structural adjustment here
needs time, and

political representatives are constantly lobbying
for the import taxes that are not

under an agreement with the

IMF

until July 1997.

allowed

169

Pensions are low, and employment

opportunities for elderly people are scarce, but the situation

is still

better than in the

neighbor countries, and the Estonians might well be aware of it.
Moreover, pension
creases are

more

likely if the

so pensioners

fail,

that they

Much

would

may

government

politics turn out to

to

try to

unemployed

become self-employed by

become re-employed

oppositional

fits

are not a

homogeneous group. Apart from

who

setting

as industrial workers.

economic

So the disadvantaged

enough

to unite the

it,

the Estonian

169

that the worst

See EIU 1/97,

seems

between

fail to

try

form a strong
social bene-

people across social and ethnic borders. The gen-

policy, though exposed to a lot of criticism,

profited from

do so now

also a difference

up small businesses and those who

Way worked well.

poorly enough to forge them into a truly challenging

to

is

movement because unemployment, underemployment and low

are not reason

eral

if they

prefer a radical reversion.

like the Russians, the

who

be successful than

in-

be interested in policy changes in their favor, but not to an extent

the difference between rural and urban unemployed, there

those

its

to be over.

p. 9.

99

is

not discredited. For those

For the others,

it

‘left alternative’,

has not worked

and

it

is

not likely

Despite

its

commitment

general

theless tried to

dampen

immediately, not

effects

its

all state

shock therapy, the Estonian government
has never-

to

where

possible.

Not

all

prices have been liberalized

enterprises have been radically closed just
because they were

momentarily unproductive

after the reforms.

170

As I have shown with

the

example of the

finance sector, deliberation played a role even where
reforms were to be quick and radical.

1

This

is

undoubtedly true for the begginnings of the reforms, and

now that,

after the

995 elections, the most eager reformers, the young urban
professionals from the Reform

Party, are actually in opposition, this

What

is

striking is that,

is

even

less unlikely to change.

even though there

still

are

many remnants from

the old re-

gime, the basic economic problems the country has to deal with are not
restricted to Estonia and other transition economies

Western economies, have
First,

many of the jobs

lower income

which

is

levels,

who

to deal with

that

opted for a similar path

them

-

the role-models, the

as well.

have been created

in the trade

and services sector are

at the

with the exception of the financial services. This development,

not unlike that of Western countries such as the US, does not create an adequate

revenue base which would allow for an extension of the social services.

seems unlikely

that the situation in the job

171

Second,

it

market will improve essentially within the

next years. The potential for further economic modernization implies increases in pro-

duction, but also less

ployment

rate

demand

might level out

170

In fall 1992, for

171

at the

See Lieven (1993),

See Reardon (1996),

p.

p.

let

unem-

high rates of Western Europe. Third, the process of

example, the government waived unpaid taxes owned by a big

Narva, because they did not want to
rate further.

for labor. Regardless of the official data, the real

textile

company

in

the situation in this hard-hit (and mainly Russian) region deterio-

360.

633.

100

widening income

differentials will continue

under the present policies, again not
unlike

the trend in the major Western countries.
While self-sufficiency and

illicit

work might

take the explosiveness out of these
developments, at least in the short term,

it

can surely

not be regarded as a solution in the long term.

The

social benefits are set at a very

low

level.

This was not only done of necessity, be-

cause the balanced budget law does not allow for

much

leeway,

ately to set an incentive for the people to think
for themselves
their

own hands,

mendable
liberal

something they were not used

to

It

and

was

also

done deliber-

to take matters into

under the communist regime.

policy, because self-initiative of the individual

paradigm.

it

is

one of the cornerstone of the

cannot be denied, however, that the economic activity of individuals

does not necessarily have to create socially desirable outcomes, especially
not
opportunities cannot be provided.

children,

which

A com-

results, for

The impoverishment

if

equal

especially of families with

example, from the lack of tax breaks,

is

seen

young

at least in the

case of neighbor Latvia as one reason for the increase of prostitution and similar activities, or,

as the economist calls

it,

the ‘sexual services market ’.

172

We should keep in mind, however, that shock therapy and the Estonian Way do by no
means demand

that the society be subject to aspects of

transformation process leads an

kets and liberalism.

It

economy from

172

central planning

and communism

to

does not say anything about the shape of the market economy

the transformation has been completed.

omy

economic efficiency alone. The

Whether a country opts

along the models of Germany and Sweden, or whether

See Taurins (1996).

101

it

for a social

mar-

after

market econ-

embraces the policies of

Reagan and Thatcher,

is

only the ‘fine tuning’

end of the road

at the

to private ownership,

175
private financial markets and active
labor markets.

The

mam question for the people of Estonia is therefore whether

transition

is

able to establish institutions which will in
the long term ensure that the trans-

formation process will be confined to the boundaries

set

up by the regulatory

currency board and the peg have been of good service
so

far.

at least until the

year 2000.

174

What remains

to be

done

The

policy.

They have not been unchal-

lenged, but they have not been changed either,
and the government
it

the shock therapy

is

until then,

determined to keep

however, might

eventually prove to be even more difficult than the quick
reforms: the expansion of the
social safety net in a financially sustainable

for steps in this direction

is

way, so

that the

peg

is

not endangered.

Room

indeed given. Tax evasion will eventually be reduced, and tax

revenues increased, as a more and more efficient bureaucracy develops.
Moreover, the
tax system itself might allow for a change towards
ple

by a change from the present

trial

far as the

currency board

ample discussion about

its

,/J

175

it

rate to a progressive one.

See Sachs (1990),

concerned, the economic

why

me to

literature,

As

the indus175

consistent.

which contains

its

purpose. However, the discussion of rea-

deduce several conditions

that

would have

Estonian government can decide to drop the currency board.

p.

21.

See E1U 3/96, pp. 11-12.
See Cornelius and Weber (1996),

p.

exam-

a currency board should be introduced, provides

has fulfilled

establishment allow

fulfilled before the

is

the reasons

on when

clear statements

sons for

174

income tax

redistributive effects, for

economies have shown, economic growth and equity may well be

As

no

flat

more

602.
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to

be

First, the

government should have
central

bank

sufficient experience

effectively. Second, the Estonian

and well-trained

staff at its

hands

to

economy should have developed up

run a

to a

point where the severe monetary
disturbances that are likely to appear
during a transition

period are no longer a threat, which means
that the country has reached a stage
of eco-

nomic

stability in

which the government

downs of business

made

at

keep up

cycles. Third, the decision to

a time and in a context in which

commitment

its

will only

it

is

have to deal with the ‘usual’ ups and

abandon the currency board should be

clear to

to a policy of stability.

With the methods of the personnel management,
assess exactly

ingly.

how good

its

staff

is,

and the

rather subjective question,

is

open

the

officials

How far developed the Estonian economy

however,

everybody that the government will

is,

for interpretations

Bank of Estonia should be

able to

can draw their conclusions accord-

on the other hand, appears

to

be a

by everyone. The biggest problem,

posed by the third condition. Whether a government will actually

stick to its

declared intentions can only be answered ex post. Allowing for a policy change always
implies that the policy will indeed be changed sooner or
this context is the will

of the public for stability-oriented

prevails, the government,

ultimately clear

felt that its

The

is

any government, will

that there is indeed

room

try to

later.

What remains important

politics.

As long

in

as this will

meet the demand. What becomes

for dropping or phaseing out the board if

it

is

time has come.

self-restraint that the Estonian

government imposed upon

itself

by adopting the

currency board did successfully propel the country towards market economy and political

stability.

While experts might debate about the extent of the

103

social costs that

were

in-

volved with

it,

we

cannot overlook the most unmistakable
empirical proof available. Al-

most every day news can be read about an Eastern
Europe

which

tries

try to

government of ex-Communists

stop the country’s decline into mass poverty

its

with examples of coun-

reform their economies in a different way.
In Bulgaria, the people took

to the streets in to force the

and

filled

politics possibly get? In Albania,

-

to resign over

how much more

its

failure to

discredited can a party

hundreds of thousands of people

lost their sav-

ings in financial schemes, while there are signs
that the government, which must have

known,

profited

from

it

and did therefore not warn the public

to reforms than the Estonian

day, and even

doubtful.

“The

its

to these sad

-

176

now

Whether

it

will

now

be able to set off the remaining

within the set of rules prescribed by the currency board, or

Way

international financial

to lose tax revenues

at will

manage

some

social reforms without being punished

community, whether the country,

to

pay

produce more and more,

not

like

many

by the

others, will continue

from corporations who operate internationally and can therefore
profit taxes

whether employment can be secured

Newsweek magazine

-, is

any longer. Whether the global market economy forces

will allow the country to introduce

176

is

but in any case within the scope of monetary stability and free markets

a question of the Estonian

most

called a democratic country to-

examples, Estonia indeed deserves to be described as

Country That Could “.

negative sides of transition

it,

quite a different approach

future as an economically and politically independent
state

Compared

Little

without

Way. Belarus can hardly be

-

all this is

where the

in a

rates

world where

of taxation are the lowest,

less

and

less

people are needed to

not a question of the approach to these free global

headline as quoted in Laar (1996),

104

p. 97.

al-

markets Estonia has taken. The quick reforms
have generally brought the expected
sults,

even

if

they

may have

not fulfilled

world of neoclassical economics, and

ways

.

That even

in this

all

it is

the promises.

doing

far better

The country has
than others

world the sun does not always shine

story.
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-

who

that is a

re-

arrived in the

tried ‘third

whole

different

APPENDIX

A SHORT CHRONOLOGY

1721

late

Treaty of Nystadt. Estonia becomes part of the
Russian Empire
under Peter the Great

1

8th century

1917

Tsarist Russification policies are

met with raising national
awareness and activism for independence

Demand of autonomy by

the national assembly of Estonia during

the Russian Revolution

Feb 24, 1918

Estonian independence declared

German
Jan

-

Mar 1919

troops occupy the Baltic provinces

Estonian forces drive out the Bolsheviks that had followed the

Germans
Feb

2,

1920

Tartu Peace Treaty signed. The Soviet Union accepts Estonian

independence

1928

Aug

Estonia introduces the kroon as
23, 1939

to the Soviet sphere

June 1940

Soviet Union invades Estonia

Aug

Estonia

late

1

940

is

declared a republic of the

The Gorbachev

1980s

national currency

Molotov-Ribbentrop pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet

Union assignes Estonia

6,

its

of influence

USSR

era of g lasnost gives rise to public expression of

political protest. Ecological

concerns create the

first

autonomous

political action in Soviet Estonia.

August 1989

Moscow accepts

the existence of the illegitimate secret protocol of

the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, a quasi-acceptance of the
illegitimacy of Soviet rule over the Baltic States

March

18,

1990

Supreme Council Elections
for

independence

106

in Estonia lead to a two-third majority

Aug

20, 1990

Supreme Council declares the Soviet annexation
and proclaims “ de jure'' independence

to

be cancelled

Aug

19, 1991

In the course of the attempted coup
against Gorbachev in Moscow,
Soviet troops try to seize public buildings
in Riga (Latvia) and
march towards Tallinn

Aug

20, 1991

Estonian Supreme Council declares the restoration
of
independence
In the following weeks, Estonia receives
international recognition

Sept

6,

1991

The Soviet

State Council recognizes Estonia’s independence

September 1991

Estonia joins the United Nations

Dec

The Soviet Union ceases

31, 1991

to exist

Feb 26, 1992

Estonian legislative adopts Citizenship Law, which guarantees
Estonian citizenship to individuals who were Estonian citizens
before June 16, 1940, and their descendants

June 20, 1992

The Estonian kroon

June 28, 1992

The parliamentary

Sept 20, 1992

Parliamentary elections give small majority to a center-right

replaces the ruble

constitution

is

passed in a referendum

coalition

May

1993

June 21, 1993

Estonia admitted to the Council of Europe

Political crisis after the passage

amended

of the

Law on

Aliens.

Law

after presidential veto

February 1994

Estonia joins the Partnership for Peace program of NATO

April 1994

The

Baltic states sign a free trade agreement

Aug

The

last

Jan

31, 1994

1,

March

1995

5,

1995

Russian troops pull out of Estonia

Free Trade Agreement with the

EU

Second Parliamentary elections

shift

in force

power toward

the center,

brings seats for a coallition of ethnic Russian parties and
eliminates several nationalist figures

107

November 1995

Estonia’s associate membership in the
Parliament

Estonia applies formally for

108

EU ratified by European

EU membership
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